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CHAPTER I
Introduction
On December 10, 1988, the United Nations celebrated the
fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Unfortunately there was little in the way of
empirical evidence to cause celebration. State terrorism,
according to Herman's estimate, claimed the lives of several
million people between 1962 and 1982. This does not include
people who were terrorized by governments in some manner just
short of death. Amnesty International reported that more
countries were charged with human rights abuses last year than
at any time in the organization's 27 year history. Ninety of
the one hundred and thirty-five human rights abusing countries
are guilty of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners.
Despite its widespread practice and severity, state
repression/terrorism has suffered from a lack of social
science attention. John McCamant comments,
Although human rights advocates have awakened those
who would listen to the human tragedy of violations
of civil and political liberties, social scientists
have, by and large, continued to ignore political
repression.
Alex Schmid also points out the imbalance in scholarship,
Terrorism by regimes has a longer history than
Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South
End Press, 1982) .
2 John McCamant, "Governance Without Blood: Social
Science's Antiseptic View of Rule; or, The Neglect of Political
Repression," The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Govermental
Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984)
,
p. 11.
insurgent terrorism and from this one could expect
that theory formation is more advanced and that the
number of available theories is greater. But that
is not so. Except for the writings on
totalitarianism there is not much to fall back on.
Why has state repression and terrorism been largely
ignored by social scientists? Ted Gurr provides an
explanation,
Most definitions of the state in social scientific
analysis incorporate the Weberian notion that the
state is characterized by legitimacy and a monopoly
of the means of coercion. From this perspective,
"state terrorism" is merely a pejorative label for
what states do by right.
Such a perspective, so biased in favor of the state, helps
explain why state terrorism is ignored. Not all scholars
share this perspective—Richard Falk, George Lopez, Michael
Stohl, John McCamant, Jorge Dominquez, and Alex Schmid all
advocate more scholarly analysis of the state as terrorist.
Some social scientists who live under repressive regimes do
not ignore state terrorism. Researchers in Chile have
established underground social science centers committed to
the analysis of governmental violence. In an effort to
circumvent the heavy censorship in South Africa, an
Alex Schmid, Political Terrorism; A Research Guide to
Concepts, Theories. Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publishing Company, 1983)
,
p. 171.
4 ....Ted Robert Gurr, "The Political Origins of State Violence
and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," Government Violence and
Repression: An Agenda for Research (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1986)
,
p. 45.
internationally distributed underground news analysis entitled
"South Scan" has been established.
When a particular type of regime behavior takes the lives
of so many people and injures many more, it clearly should not
be ignored.
It is instructive to note that, in contrast to the
paucity of scholarship on state terrorism, there has in recent
years been a proliferation of writings on non-state terrorism.
This state of affairs is extremely unbalanced, for the fact
remains that the overwhelming percentage of human rights
violations are perpetrated by states against their own
citizens or populations under their control. Why do states
use severe violence against people? Scholars have suggested
that states use terrorism as a means of enforcing ideological
positions.
Literature Review
This review of the literature is focused on state
terrorism and associated variables. Generally the literature
on state terror and repression falls into two categories. One
consists of philosophical and theoretical literature. This
literature proposes to explain state terrorism, yet for the
most part lacks social scientific analysis. The other
consists of raw data on human rights violations documented by
human rights monitoring agencies. Both types of information
are required for this study.
The data from human rights agencies consist of reports
detailing severe human rights violations by governments. A
wide range of non-governmental organizations collect and
document information of this kind. Sources such as Amnesty
International are valuable to any study of human rights
violations. They are not, in and of themselves, works of
social science analysis.
Prior to examining the literature, the paucity of
writings on the topic of state terrorism is addressed. The
reason for neglect of this topic is twofold. First, there is
the Weberian bias in favor of the legitimacy of the state.
This bias, according to McCamant, is related to a general flaw
in models in mainstream academia that make political
repression irrelevant. The emphasis has been on the social
forces which make a system function smoothly. The political
repression present in a system was not seen to be important
because it was used against elements not contributing but
rather detracting from the driving mechanisms of society. The
"ideal" system is analogous to an organic body where all cells
make a contribution unless they are deviant, therefore
cancerous, and consequently deserving of excision. Arendt
shows that people defined as threats and "superfluous" to a
Gurr, op. cit. , p. 45-46.
McCamant, op. cit. , p. 2 3-25.
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system can be eliminated with relative ease. The emphasis on
system maintenance is not necessarily a recent bias.
State terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. Governments
have employed terror as a means of control from ancient times
to the present. Public hangings, torture, inquisitions,
crucifixions, floggings and a wide range of other punishments
have been common methods of enforcing the policies of empire
and state.
Machiavelli's (1469-1527), The Prince , is one of the
older works advocating the use of skillful cruelty as a means
of instilling fear in a populace. Machiavelli had no
compunction in recommending the use of severe force as a means
of governance. His prescriptions were calculated to maintain
the prince's rule. Over time government through violence
has become a sophisticated endeavor. Arendt wrote, in the
aftermath of World War II, on the origins of totalitarian
government. From her study she theorized that the "essence"
of totalitarian government is terror and the basis for such
behavior is ideological. Totalitarian ideologies identify
their enemies even before acquiring power - they are exact in
defining the enemy. Terror is used by the totalitarian regime
first as a tactic to consolidate power by eliminating
opposition, and later as an ideologically based attack on
those defined as "objective threats" to the state. "Objective
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966) p. 437.
5
threats" to the state are ideologically derived, they are
judged as inherently threatening, and they are not necessarily
threats by their acts or behaviors. It is important to stress
that such "objective enemies of the state" may have done
nothing in opposition to the state. Arendt's philosophical
study explicitly contends that Weltanschauung (worldview)
plays a critical role in the facilitation of state terror.
Totalitarian ideologies, according to Arendt, assume that one
idea (reductionism) explains everything. An abstract
perception or worldview cannot be superseded by facts or
experience. Facts and experiences are to be molded and shaped
to fit ideological frameworks. But totalitarian ideologies
in and of themselves have no capability to transform reality,
terror is the "device" used for transformation. Arendt's
contribution is to focus attention on the importance of the
Q
ideological variable in the analysis of state terrorism.
Like Arendt, Kren and Rappoport found that the SS perpetrated
terror and genocide based on ideological beliefs. The SS were
. 9committed to the metaphysical ideals of National Socialism.
McCamant has criticized writings on totalitarianism as
limited in such a way that, totalitarianism is made into an
"aberration, and by implication, it presumes that governmental
Ibid . . p. 460-479.
g George Kren and Leon Rappoport, The Holocaust and the
Crisis of Human Behavior (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980)
.
terror does not exist in other polities." McCamant's
concern is that terror not be seen as specific only to so-
called totalitarian governments. State-terrorism is committed
by governments of various typologies, many not considered to
be totalitarian. McCamant's point, as well as that of those
who analyze state terror in the "third world," is particularly
relevant to this study because the model applied here is not
restricted to totalitarian regimes. Schmid claims that Arendt
overstates the role of terror. Terror is only one aspect of
totalitarian rule. An exaggerated emphasis on terror
overlooks the system support factors such as mobilization of
the population, legitimization through massive popular
support, the party and ideology. Schmid and McCamant place
emphasis on the recognition of nontotalitarian state
terrorism.
Totalitarianism is a confusing term in the sense that
there is no exact and clear distinction between authoritarian
and totalitarian government. Some scholars regard the
supposed differences as irrelevant because one can usually
find totalitarianism in governments labelled as strictly
authoritarian by others. However, Schmidt, like Arendt, sees
the importance of ideology to any analysis of state terror.
Although Schmid does not elaborate at length on analytical
McCamant, op. cit. . p. 11.
Schmid, op. cit. . p. 171.
models, he emphasizes the structural-functional aspects of a
system and implicitly suggests the efficacy of a systems
analysis model which recognizes the ideological variable.
Schmid conducted a study of scholars who deal with terrorism.
When asked which current theories explaining the rise of state
terrorism are worthwhile for empirical testing, more than half
of the researchers either left the question unanswered,
answered "none" or did not know. Of those responding, the
theories of Arendt, Walter, and Aron were each mentioned twice
12
as worthwhile for empirical testing.
Walter studied several tribal African communities and
looked at rulers secure in their authority who, nevertheless,
chose to rule through violence and fear. His subject regimes
were not totalitarian. Walter found an "ideology that
justifies the violence" as one of the most important
conditions for terrorism. Additionally Walter determined that
13the victims must be expendable or superfluous to the system.
Aron discusses terror as the dialectical outcome of
subversion and repression - a state of fear is the result.
Aron ' s bias is essentially conservative, for he accuses
revolutionaries, not states, of initiating and taking
14political terror to the furthest degree. Nevertheless,
12 Ibid . . p. 171.
13 Ibid . . p. 171-172.
14 Raymond Aron, Peace and War; A Theory of International
Relations (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966) p. 169-170.
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Aron, like Arendt and Walter, shares the notion that ideology
plays a key role in the use of terror. Aron finds German and
Japanese actions in World War II based on what he calls a
geographical ideology which harbored the guiding principles
for the acquisition of more land and space through military
conquest. 15
A great deal of the philosophical literature on state
repression pertains to the Nazi, Stalinist, Fascist, or
various Communist regimes. In addition to ignoring
nontotalitarian government violence, authors specializing in
totalitarian government have been criticized as "poisoned" by
their ideological bias. Inevitably writers have slanted
their discussions of state terror to indict either left wing
or right wing regimes. In particular, writers show a strong
inclination to link state terror with a specific economic
system. Some authors have excused so-called authoritarian
governments on the grounds that they are more able to change
than totalitarian governments. However, Falk's research
indicates severe repression cuts across the boundaries of
economic systems. Falk does not contend that economic
variables play no role, but rather that state repression and
terror can and do exist under a variety of different economic
systems. Thus, politics, not economics, plays the critical
15 Ibid . , p. 197-209.
Schmid, op.cit.
. p. 174.
role in explaining state terror. It is not necessarily the
national economic system of a state that determines state
terrorism. Falk holds the state-centered international system
at fault. The near automatic legitimacy of the state in an
international environment where geopolitical considerations
reign supreme makes issues of human rights nearly irrelevant.
Falk draws attention directly to the problem of the state and
its use of violence.
The broadened perspective of Falk, Schmid, and McCamant
includes all repressive governments, not just those defined
as totalitarian. Writing in the late 1970' s, Falk predicted
the growing prevalence of "hard states," i.e., states capable
of executing extreme forms of repression while simultaneously
resisting, insulating, and ignoring pressures from the
outside. The "hard state" hypothesis applies to states
governed by extreme "statism" which are generally unconcerned
about violating human rights. Falk lists eight categories of
human right violations: genocide; official racism; large
scale official terrorism; totalitarian governance; deliberate
refusal to satisfy basic human needs; ecocide; and war crimes.
Large-scale official terrorism is, according to Falk, "when
a government systematically engages in terror to maintain its
political control or intimidate its opposition." Falk does
Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New
York: Holmes and Meir Publishers, 1981) p. 63-124.
18 Ibid . . p. 178-179.
10
not specify the difference between "large-scale" and "small-
scale" terrorism.
The use of "small" scale terrorism in a sophisticated
manner is precisely what Arancibia found the Chilean regime
employing as a means of improving the junta's image abroad
after large scale state terrorism had eliminated most of the
19
opposition. Falk's typology of "hard states" is an
important contribution to the study of state terror, but
rigorous criteria for determining precisely what defines a
"hard state" are not specified by Falk. It can be surmised
from Falk's writings that hard states are spartan, closed to
political innovation, authoritarian, and possessing large
military and security establishments. These factors give the
researcher a general direction. Even states which might be
considered "hard states," Chile, for example, eventually
attempt to refine state terror in such a way as to minimize
the impact of negative publicity. Arancibia, Charlin and
Landstreet analyze Chile's utilization of information from
dissident social science sources, and determine repression to
be related to ideological motivations:
One must recall that the original point of the coup
d'etat was to remove the left from power, bring it
under permanent control and thus safeguard an
endangered capitalist economic system. State
terrorism and state repression in general have been
rational policies designed and implemented by the
19 Jinny Arancibia, Marcel Charlin, and Peter Landstreet,
"Chile," International Handbook of Human Rights , edited by Jack
Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987) p.
49-73.
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military opvernment in pursuit of these
objectives.
Without the extreme commitment to certain ideological
principles the motivation to implement policies of terrorism
would be absent. State terrorism fits into the Weltanschauung
of the Chilean junta. Thus, state terror was the praxis
necessary to uphold a particular ideological prescription.
Arancibia, et al. analyzed the state of siege and
emergency proclamations in Chile and determined that these
decrees amounted to a state of war providing the "legal" basis
under military rule for detained persons to "disappear."
Arrests were actually called "capture of the enemy" and those
21individuals killed (30,000) were "war casualties."
Arancibia, et al. discuss repression in Chile as having
five stages:
1. Eruption of Repression, 1973-74.
2. Institutionalization of Repression, 1974-77.
3. Repressive Stabilization, 1977-81.
4. Constitutional Repression, 1981-83.
5. Repression and Major Civil Resistance, 1983-present.
Two general periods of repression were discerned. From 1973
to 1977, there was "unchecked state terrorism." From 1977 to
the present, the repression has been more selective under a
"legal" constitutional facade. The stages of repression in
Chile elaborated by Arancibia, help to sharpen the analysis
of state terror.
Ibid . . p. 68.
21 Ibid . . p. 54-55.
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Lewellen addresses state terror in El Salvador from a
systems analysis perspective. The El Salvadorean polity is
viewed as an "organic" system wherein the boundaries of the
system define the limits to change. Lewellen 's analysis finds
that state repression is the "logical result of the
organization of the system itself, a system designed to create
poverty and inequality. Repression is the only means by
22
which the system boundaries can be maintained." The elite
or ruling class in El Salvador define the system boundaries
and are anxious to maintain these boundaries. The ruling
oligarchy or a particular group within the oligarchy is often
supported by external forces - the United States in the case
of El Salvador. Lewellen discusses the political system and
its boundaries. The oligarchy defines the boundaries and uses
repression as a means of maintaining system boundaries.
Boundaries, thus, are limits imposed on those who live under
the particular political system. In El Salvador, the
oligarchy defines the boundaries in such a way that real
political participation exists only for a few elite families.
This causes dissent and opposition. The state responds to
dissent and opposition through the use of repression and state
terrorism. First the government imposes severe repression,
then escalates the use of violence to state terrorism. In El
22 Ted C. Lewellen, "Structures of Terror: A Systems
Analysis of Repression in El Salvador," Human Rights and Third
World Development , edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr. , and Ved P.
Nanda (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 59-81.
13
Salvador, like Chile, "all opposition" is to be "exterminated,
23 ...including moderates." The ruling elite articulates an
ideology which serves their interests and defines the system
boundaries while practical politics calls for certain policies
designed to maintain the system. Lewellen's model views the
repressive state as the original cause of oppositional
violence and analyzes the violent system maintenance actions
of the decision-makers. The systems approach view is not
intended by Lewellen to break from other perspectives; rather
it is complementary. Lewellen does not deny other
explanations, but holds many explanations as compatible with
his systems theory approach. He articulates an analysis which
shows state terrorism as systemic to the overall El
Salvadorean socio-political system. In this respect,
Lewellen's analysis is similar to the authors (Lewin, Alcock,
Galtung) who stress the structural violence of poverty and
inequality. Lewellen contends state terrorism is predictable.
Bowen, in his analysis of Guatemala, examines the
24
structural violence of poverty and inequality. Then he
traces the establishment of a counterrevolutionary state,
followed by counterinsurgency as the "midwife to state
terrorism." Bowen finds the problem in Guatemala to be the
91,
Ibid . . p. 59.
24 Gordon L. Bowen, "The Political Economy of State
Terrorism: Barrier to Human Rights in Guatemala," Human Rights
and Third World Development , edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr.
,
and Ved P. Nanda (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 83-124.
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structure of the state and its use of state terrorism as a
functional form of rule. External support from the U.S.
helped facilitate the establishment of a state of terror in
Guatemala.
The search for a general theory of state terrorism led
Duvall and Stohl to develop a universally applicable theory
of state terrorism. The level of their theory is very
general. Those who make decisions to implement policies of
state terrorism believe terrorism is "relatively more
effective" than alternative means of governance. Terrorism
is efficacious relative to other options in "eliminating or
quieting some actual or perceived challenge or threat."
Duvall and Stohl claim that terrorism may not be seen as
highly efficacious, but only more efficacious when compared
to other means deemed ineffective. Duvall and Stohl found
that state terrorism may be initiated by strong states or weak
states. The weak state engages in terrorism because it is a
relatively effective means of regime maintenance. Strong
states which are "militaristic states" and/or which function
in an "ideological-mission syndrome" engage in state terrorism
when domestic retribution is low and/or when they are not
25
significantly affected by international pressure.
Governments having had successful past experiences with state
Schmid, op. cit. , p. 177-178.
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terrorism are expected to use terror more intensely and more
often.
Gurr proposes the analysis of state terrorism within the
framework of conflict theory. Conflict theory posits that
state terrorism comes about through interaction between elites
and oppositions. In Gurr's view, it is not sufficient to
explain state terrorism by examining the characteristics of
the state and ruling elite. Gurr differentiates between
situational and institutionalized state terrorism. Regimes
that use state terror over a long time period have
institutionalized terrorism. Examples include the Soviet KGB,
NKVD, OGPU; SAVAK (Iran), and DINA (Chile), and the "secret"
death squads in Guatemala, El Salvador and Argentina.
Situational state terror is carried out in short, harsh,
reactive bursts, after which it is dropped. Gurr advocates
a model which examines the challengers, the state and
political ideology, social heterogeneity and inequality, and
27
"the global environment.
Gurr starts his analysis by looking at the group, class
or party whom the elite regard as a threat to their rule.
The "challengers" pose a conflict with the regime which would
not, according to Gurr, resort to state terror without
PR
Gurr, op. cit. . p. 45.
Ibid . . p. 51-71.
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28provocation by the challengers. This view is not shared by
other authors. Arendt and Walter show cases where the
state initiates terrorism against groups simply defined as
enemies. Marx also starts the analysis at a different point,
contending that conditions of oppression and repression exist
before consciousness drives people to challenge the state.
However, Gurr does recognize the importance of studying the
character of the state, its ideological outlook and prevailing
political traditions as a means of understanding the
phenomenon of state terrorism. The analysis done by Gurr
posits that democratic values are the barrier to state terror.
In addition, Gurr finds that social heterogeneity and
29inequality are positively associated with state terror.
Minority elites in highly stratified societies are likely to
use state terror - South Africa serves as Gurr's example. The
global environment impacts on a given state's use of state
terrorism - states participating in international geopolitical
competition are more likely to use state terrorism. Gurr
stresses the supremacy of situational, not structural factors.
Gurr focuses on the situational aspects of elite/non-elite
interactions. The only structural condition associated with
state terrorism is the case of minority rule in a highly
Ibid . . p. 51.
Ibid . . p. 58.
17
stratified society. Additionally, Gurr stresses the past use
of terror as a determinant of state terrorism.
Gurr ' s analysis does not contend that state terrorism is
systemically explainable, rather it is situationally
explainable. The challengers create the situation by
provoking the state. The challenger's behavior is explained
through the theory of relative deprivation. State terrorism
is not an inevitable outcome of particular socio-political
systems. In contrast, Lewellen's conceptualization of the
organic system makes the state behavior more predictable.
The literature on state terrorism, although limited,
directs the researcher towards the question of ideology and
state terrorism. Different explanations exist for state
terrorism: totalitarianism; systems theory; conflict theory;
authoritarianism; "hard state" theory; and class struggle
theory. The role of ideology is a variable of most
explanations. Some explanations rely more on ideology than
others (Arendt, Walter, Aron, Arancibia, Kren) . The emphasis
on ideology does not necessarily associate a particular
political economy with state terrorism, but instead proposes
that a certain type of Weltanschauung in governmental elites
is associated with state terrorism. If this "worldview" were
not such as it is, the use of state terror as a means of
governance would not occur. This view asserts that a given
elite has a certain conceptualization of nation-state and/or
regime security (often the two are synonymous to those in
18
power) which is associated with the use of state terrorism.
The ideology in question here has been called national
security ideology (George Lopez) . Admiral Guzzetti, Foreign
Minister in the Argentine junta during the "dirty war,"
expressed national security in biological-organic terms:
My idea of subversion is that of the left-wing
terrorist organizations. Subversion or terrorism
of the right is not the same thing. When the social
body of the country has been contaminated by a
disease that eats away its entrails, it forms
antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered
in the same way as microbes.
Guzzetti speaks in terms of the very survival of the state as
a desperate Mannichean battle.
Lopez's examination of national security ideology posits
a relationship with systematic governmental violence and state
terror. Lopez asserts:
I argue that the justification for and maintenance
of this patterned and persistent violence by
government against real and presumed adversaries
rests in the discrete, identifiable and self-
reinforcing dimensions of a shared mindset of
governing elites.
Although Lopez examines the national security "mindset"
of Latin American elites, he maintains similar processes occur
elsewhere. Lopez finds that elites using state violence feel
that they embody the state and therefore are on a mission to
protect defined values. General Pinochet defines the state
as an "organic component," produced by "people settled on a
ou The Nation . 31. October 1987, p. 477.
31 Lopez, op. cit. . p. 75.
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portion of territory both of which are united under the idea
of the state." 32
In the name of state security, national security ideology
authorizes and justifies state terrorism. It is the ideology
which lifts all restraints against severe and routine
violation of human rights. National security ideology "is the
guarantee given by the state to achieve or defend national
33 ...goals against hostilities and pressures." Operationalizmg
national security ideology requires the implementation of
internal war on challengers to regime power and program. The
"enemy" is defined as a human representation of "ideas and
social forces," regardless of whether or not the ideas
34
culminate in oppositional action. National security
ideology thus pertains to internal state security. It does
not pertain to the internationally recognized right to defend
against external attack or invasion—such a concept is
considered a matter of national security, but not national
security ideology.
Lopez contributes to research on state terrorism by
articulating an ideological explanation. This ideological
explanation consists of a particular conceptualization of
state security held by ruling elites. Research into state
32
33
34
Ibid
.
,
p. 81.
Ibid
.
,
p. 76.
Ibid
.
, p. 83-84
.
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terrorism should test for the presence of ideological
prescriptions pertaining to state security.
The more specific literature comparing the South African
and Israeli regimes is important to this study. Authors
writing on Israel and South Africa point to the importance of
ideology, but they do not show in depth how an exclusivist
ideology can facilitate active policies which constitute state
terrorism. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the
available comparative literature on South Africa and Israel.
35Adam (Frankfurt School) sees both South Africa and
Israel as ethnic states possessing the gualities of a
"sovereign protectorate" wherein the state is defined in terms
of the myths and symbols of the ruling group. The state is
the exclusive domain of a particular ruling group committed
to an ideology which is the possession of only that group.
Ethnic states translate the ruling group's ideology into laws
and customs "at the expense of secular citizenship rights."
These types of states govern over populations determined to
be "untrustworthy at birth." Prime examples of ethnic states
are Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel. Adam points
out that these states, because of their economic or strategic
positions, remain in the orbit of the Western world. Both
South Africa and Israel are established regional powers. Both
35 ... . .Heribert Adam, "Ethnic Politics and Crisis Management:
Comparing South Africa and Israel," South Africa: The Limits to
Reform Politics (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) pp. 4-
21.
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serve Western strategic interests, but their ideologies are
not shared in common with the West. The ruling elites in
Pretoria and Tel Aviv have "parochial" ideological principles
which take precedence over international considerations. Both
ethnic states wage repression to eliminate genuinely
representative voices of the opposition. This has tended to
leave no credible spokesmen to negotiate with and indicates
a lack of interest in realistic negotiations. Both the Likud
and Labor Parties reject outright any possibility of a
Palestinian state. The National Party denies African
nationalism and completely rejects the one person one vote
concept. Adam contends that under such circumstances there
is little hope for a consociational solution because there is
no agreement on a common civic culture.
Adam rejects Marxian class struggle and liberal pluralist
explanations of the role of the state in each country.
Instead he sees the state in a condition of crisis management
fighting to maintain its political and ideological system.
The state is responsible for the violence and crisis due to
its implementation of ethnocentric ideology.
In another study, Joseph emphasizes the similarities
between Zionism and Apartheid in their denial of one person
one vote within the framework of a pluralistic state. Joseph
characterizes Zionism and Apartheid as "anti pluralist and
Benjamin Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows; Israel and the Land
of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988)
.
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exclusivist. " There can be no progress towards democracy with
these ideologies guiding the policies of Israel and South
Africa. Joseph stresses the "volkisch" or "tribal" nature of
Zionism and Apartheid.
. 37Louise Camkar analyzes South Africa and Israel and
highlights the way in which each society is structured
according to ideological principles. Like Adam and Joseph,
the emphasis is on ideological similarities and how there is
a distinct in-group and out-group in each society.
38Alfred Moleah contends that the ideological
similarities between Israel and South Africa make their
relationship different from the usual pragmatic relations
between other nations and South Africa. Because the two
countries have similar ways of viewing the world they share
a special relationship.
The relationship between South Africa and Israel prompted
39Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi to investigate Israeli foreign policy
and in particular its support of right-wing dictatorships.
Beit-Hallahmi discovered a long history of reactionary foreign
37 Louise Cainkar, Separate and Unequal: The Dynamics of
South African and Israeli Rule (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights
Campaign, 1985) .
38 Alfred Moleah, "Zionism and Apartheid: An Unlikely
alliance?" Judaism or Zionism: What Difference for the Middle
East? edited by The International Organization for the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (London: Zed Books, 1986)
.
39 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who
Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987)
.
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policy. South African-Israeli cooperation ranges from the
exchange of counterinsurgency advisors and nuclear weapons
research to diamond exporting.
Statement of the Problem and Research Design
The role played by ideology in the specification of what
constitutes state security is the critical question addressed
in this study. Lopez comments on the connection between
ideology and state terror:
Ideology stimulates, rationalizes, and blesses as
patriotic political behavior government actions that
deny others their basic human dignity and their
universal political rights. It reifies the state,
making it the highest institutional value to which
the ruling elite must maintain their highest
commitment. Although other factors. . .are important
components of the puzzle of state terror, they would
not fit so neatly together or be mobilized so
dynamically were it not for the joerspective and
prescription provided by ideology.
Ideology is seen as having a facilitative association to
the use of state terrorism. When scholars analyze non-state
terrorism they frequently focus on the ideological motivations
of the actors. Ideological analysis is no less important for
the study of why states use terrorism. It is proposed in this
study that ideological objectives facilitate the use of state
terrorism. Ideological prescriptions regarding state security
reveal what policies are necessary when state security is
40 George Lopez, "A Scheme for the Analysis of Government
as Terrorist," The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of
Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1984)
, pp. 65-66.
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threatened by people who reject the state's ideology and all
its inherent assumptions.
The general hypothesis reads as follows:
Ideologies which specify one particular group as
having the exclusive and, therefore, asymmetrical
right to the governance of a state, facilitate the
use of state terrorism against people defined as an
out-group.
Testing this hypothesis would entail looking at all
countries with exclusinist ideologies to check for the use of
state terrorism. The study would also have to look at all
countries without exclusivist ideologies to see whether any
used state terrorism. As this cannot be done within the
limitations of a Master's Thesis, two countries have been
chosen for case study analysis. Israel and South Africa will
each be informally tested for an exclusivist ideology and the
use of state terrorism. A two state analysis will not confirm
or disconfirm the hypothesis but it will have value as an
informal test.
Before operationalizing the terms of this hypothesis as
it applies to Israel and South Africa, it is necessary to
define (1) exclusivist ideology and (2) state terrorism.
An exclusivist ideology is an ideology which is held by
and for one particular group; other groups of people are
excluded and their rights are limited according to ideological
principles. An exclusivist ideology defines an in-group and
an out-group (Theodor Adorno ' s terms). The term exclusivist
as applied to ideology is used by Benjamin Joseph in Besieged
25
Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988)
.
State terrorism is the purposeful act or threat of
violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim
and/or audience of the act itself; a system of government that
uses terror to rule.
An exclusivist ideology is operationalized as follows.
If the ideologies stand for the following, then they can be
classified as exclusivist:
1. the state is devoted to the security of the in-
group
;
2. the state acquires land and resources for the
exclusive use of the in-group;
3. the state governs over people who are not granted
full and equal citizenship rights (the out-group)
.
Specific acts which this researcher classifies as state
terror include the following:
1. Beatings or physical attacks on the person to harm,
injure, or kill.
2. The use of shootings to kill or injure when the
target party does not threaten the shooter in a
combat situation.
3
.
The use of gas by throwing or shooting it into homes
or by shooting it at persons.
4. Denial of medical care for the wounded.
5. Sweeping raids when soldiers and security forces
are ordered, encouraged or allowed to rampage
through houses and attack people.
6. Detention without limit, or with numerous
extensions.
7. Prison conditions such that going to prison or jail
subjects the arrestee to torture, harassment, denial
of basic needs, denial of medical care and forced
labor.
8. Kidnappings and abductions.
9. Vigilante violence which is encouraged, allowed or
ignored by authorities.
10. Demolition of houses as a collective punishment.
11. Collective punishments used to induce fear in the
populace such as curfews.
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If the states selected for study fail to exhibit any
exclusivist ideological factors which facilitate the use of
state terror then the research will have determined for these
particular countries that ideology and state terror are not
associated as hypothesized.
The emphasis on ideological analysis is based on the
importance of ideology recognized in the literature on state
terrorism. The examination of ideology allows the researcher
to see whether there is an ideological basis for state
terrorism. It is important to see whether ideologies
facilitate state terrorism by determining if they specify
certain goals and objectives which call for extreme actions
on the part of the state. It is assumed in this study that
actions are based on ideas; policies are the practical means
for shaping and designing the environment. Ideologies, like
policy, may be opposed and fail or they may be modified. The
interaction between ideology, policy and circumstances is an
important one. Ideologies and their policy prescriptions are
often successfully confronted by alternative ideologies and
policies. Hopefully, research can identify what type of
ideology facilitates state terror.
By analyzing two states comparatively, it may be possible
to make generalizations leading to an enhanced and improved
explanation of state terror. Any two states can be compared
with the above methodology.
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Before reviewing the available literature on state
terrorism, certain terms are defined.
Definition of Terms
In order to address the issue of state terrorism it is
necessary to provide the following definitions of the relevant
terminology. For the purposes of this study, the following
conceptual definitions will be used:
Facilitate - to make easier or less difficult; free from
difficulty or impediment.
Ideology - a systematic scheme or coordinated body
of ideas or concepts with a sociopolitical program
as prescription.
In-group - a group of people which is, according to
ideological principles, granted the exclusive right to
govern a state. For the purpose of this study,
membership in the in-group is based on belonging to a
particular ethnic, religious, national or racial group.
Out-group - a group of people denied equal participation
in the governance of the state based on their belonging
to a particular ethnic, religious, national or racial
group.
Prescription - the process of laying down
authoritative rules or directions, the action of
laying down boundaries, limits, or restrictions,
directions to remedy a problem.
41 . ...Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(Springfield: G and C: Merriam, 1966), p. 812.
4?
** Ibid., p. 1123.
43 • ...This definition of In-group was constructed by the author
based on Theodor Adorno ' s intergroup concept in The Authoritarian
Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950)
.
44 . ...This definition of Out-group was constructed by the
author based on Theodor Adorno ' s out-group concept.
45 Webster's, op. cit. . p. 1792.
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Regime - a method of ruling or management; a manner
of administration. A form of government or
administration; a government or social system.
Repression - the use of coercion or the threat of
coercion against people and groups pressing for
reforms within the system or against opponents or
potential opponents of the system, in order to
block, prevent, control, or weaken their capability
to oppose the authorities and their policies.
State - the operations, activities, or affairs of
the government or ruling power of a country: the
sphere of administration and supreme political power
of a government.
State Security - a concept which can be defined in
different ways depending on ideological
perspectives. Frequently it is a concept which
defines the security needs of a ruling group; the
political system boundaries as defined by those in
control of the coercive forces. Ideological
principles can suggest either explicit and/or
implicit prescriptions for state security. Although
state security does represent security for some, for
others the acts perpetrated in the name of state
security axe nothing less than enforced
insecurity.
Terrorism - the purposeful act or threat of violence
to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim
and/or audience of the act itself. A system of
government that uses terror to rule.
46 Ibid
.
,
p. 1911.
47 ... . .This definition of repression is drawn from a discussion
of terms by Stohl and Lopez in The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1984) , Introductory chapter.
48 Webster's, op. cit 2228.
49 This definition was constructed by the author.
50 This definition of terrorism was drawn from Stohl, Lopez
and Arendt. Arendt emphasizes the use of terror to rule.
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Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by
the identity of the perpetrators, not the nature of the cause,
and as such, an objective definition is possible. The focus
herein is on the act itself. Terrorism can be committed by
individuals, groups, organizations and states.
The comparative literature on the South African and
Israeli regimes substantiates the claim that ideology plays
a vital role in determining security policies. The next two
chapters examine exclusivist ideology, the activation of
ideology through policy and the specific acts of military and
security forces in the Occupied Territories and South Africa.
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CHAPTER II
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Ideology
This chapter looks at political Zionism and its
prescriptions for state security as a means of checking to
see if the Israeli state follows ideological prescriptions
pertaining to the exclusive security of the Jewish community.
The state is tested for its acquisition of land and resources
for the use of the Jewish community. Israeli state policies
are examined to see how they impact on the Palestinian
population. These are the three variables which determine an
exclusivist ideology.
Political Zionism (Jewish nationalism) is the guiding
ideological foundation of the Israeli state. The Declaration
of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948
established a "Jewish State" in Palestine with purposely
undefined borders. This event was the crowning achievement
of the World Zionist Organization's fifty year campaign for
the establishment of a Jewish state. Political Zionism
explicitly calls for the establishment of a Jewish nation-
state through the return and in-gathering of the worldwide
Jewish community. Political Zionism is essentially Jewish
nationalism.
Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (London: Zed
Books, 1987)
,
p. 14.
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Political Zionism is an ideology primarily concerned with
the issues of security for the Jewish people and satisfies the
criterion for an exclusive ideology. Golda Meir was "deeply
convinced that every Jew must be a Zionist—out of the
2
elementary necessity of Jewish self-protection. 11 Thus, its
prescriptions vis-a-vis the Palestinians pertain only to the
security needs of the Jewish (Zionist) community. Uri Davis
expresses the general basis of political Zionism:
Political Zionism claims to offer a valid solution
to the question of anti-Jewish racism: The
establishment, through the Jewish colonization of
Palestine of a sovereign, exclusively Jewish State;
the transformation of Arab Palestine through the
dispossession and mass transfer of the Palestinian
Arab population, into Jewish Israel, an Israel that
would, in the words of Haim Weizmann, subsequently
first President of the State of Israel, "be as
Jewish as America is American or England English."
In its concern for the security of the Jewish community,
political Zionism was forced early to address the presence of
Palestinians. Political Zionism is explicit in defining the
Palestinians as the out-group. Political Zionism stood for
the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine
and the depopulation of the area in order to make way for
Jewish settlement. Although Zionist leaders portrayed their
ideology as one of national liberation and sent emissaries to
Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpeter, Who Rules Israel? (New
York: Harper and Row, 1973)
,
p. 35.
3 Davis, op. cit. . p. 4.
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Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, both refused to
recognize political Zionism as a liberation movement.
The present day Jewish state is faced with a security
dilemma in the context of Zionist thought. In order to
maintain a Jewish state wherein democratic structures pertain
to the Jewish community it cannot extend full rights to the
1.5 million Palestinians who live under occupation. The
conceptualization of security in Israel has been such that
martial law, and policies of discrimination and expropriation
were applied even to the Palestinian population within the
Green Line (1949 Armistice Lines) . Granting full and equal
rights to Palestinians would mean the end of political Zionism
and the loss of Jewish statehood.
In defining the Israeli system, Kimmerling argues for
including the West Bank and Gaza primarily because Israeli
economic integration policies have treated the territories as
part of Greater Israel. In addition, ideology treats the
areas as part of Israel and the areas have, as of now, been
occupied for twenty-three years. The length of occupation is
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Arms
Israel and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 23-24, and
American Friends Service Committee, Peace and Justice Journal , Vol.
2, Number 4, April/May, 1988 (Dayton, Ohio: American Friends
Service Committee)
.
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a key factor in the choice to treat the areas as not simply
5temporarily occupied.
It is important to find out what political Zionism
prescribes for the treatment of the Palestinians who live
under political Zionism.
Early and contemporary Zionist leaders were not hesitant
to express their ideas on the subject. According to a theme
within political Zionism, security of the Jewish state has in
the past and may in the future require the use of widespread
expulsion. Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism,
promoted transferring the Palestinians out of Palestine. The
notion of expelling large numbers of Palestinians from
territory on which they lived for centuries indicates the
exclusive nature of political Zionism. Joseph Weitz (1890-
1973) a long time high-ranking Zionist official reached the
conclusion in 1940 that the Jewish state could for security
reasons contain no more than 15% non-Jews. Transferring the
Palestinians was "the only solution." Weitz made the
Baruch Kimmerling, "Making Conflict a Routine:
Cumulative Effects of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Upon Israeli
Society," Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: The
Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict ,
edited by Moshe Lissak (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1984) p.
34-35.
Alan Taylor, "The Two Faces of Zionism," Judaism or
Zionism , edited by International Organization for the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (London: Zed Books, 1986)
p. 71. Also see Israel Shahak, "A History of the Concept of
'Transfer* in Zionism," Journal of Palestine Studies , Spring, 1989,
pp. 22-37.
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exclusive character of political Zionism clear in his diary
of 1940:
Among ourselves it must be clear that there is no
place in the country for both peoples
together. . .With the Arabs we shall not achieve our
aim of being independent people in this country.
Before he died in 1973, Weitz advocated the incorporation of
the Occupied Territories and the transfer of Palestinians.
The idea of transfer was put into practice during the 1948
war. Israeli forces terrorized hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians into fleeing their homes as a means of clearing
the territory for Jewish settlement. Flapan documents that,
in all, between 600,000-700,000 Palestinians fled or were
o
evicted by Zionist military forces. This experiment with
transfer was surprisingly successful, as recent declassified
gdocuments show. The Israelis possessed overwhelming
Davis, op. cit. , p. 5.
8 Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 83. Also Benny Morris, "The
Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine," Middle
East Studies . 22/1 (January, 1986)
,
p. 9-11.
9 Morns, Ibid .
. p. 9-11. Morris made extensive use of
declassified Israeli documents in his study of the Palestinian
exodus. Also see Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," From Haven
to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until
1948 , edited by Walid Khalidi (Washington: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1987) p. 795-803. Also see Christopher Hitchens,
"Broadcasts," Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the
Palestinian Question , edited by Edward W. Said and Christopher
Hitchens (New York: Verso, 1988) p. 73.
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superiority in equipment and number of forces. Palestinian
villages were simply overrun by well-organized campaigns of
terror including both psychological and physical aspects.
During the late 1940 's and throughout the 1950 's, 385
Palestinian villages were systematically destroyed by Israeli
forces.
The logic behind expulsion (transfer) can be seen within
the overall framework of Zionist ideology, i.e. the
establishment of an exclusively Jewish state on land held
12 ...
exclusively for Jews. One of the ideological questions
dealt with under political Zionism concerns the geographic
boundaries of Eretz Israel (the land of Israel) . Eretz Israel
includes "both banks of the Jordan from the Mediterranean Sea
13to the eastern desert." Thus the State of Israel, with or
without the Occupied Territories, is smaller than the Land of
Israel. According to political Zionism, state sovereignty has
room for expansion. The present lack of defined borders
Stephan Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations
with a Militant Israel, 1948/1967 (Brattleboro: AMANA Books,
1984) .
Davis, op. cit. , p. 17. See also Edward Said's book,
The Question of Palestine (New York: New York Times Books, 1980)
.
12 . ...See the exclusive Israeli Law of Return which specifies
that once any piece of land is in the hands of a Jew, it is
considered to be Jewish land forever. Uri Davis discusses this
law in Israel: An Apartheid State .
13 Daniel J. Elazar, Governing Peoples and Territories
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues/Jerusalem
Institute for Federal Studies, 1982) p. 27.
36
emerges from the basic ideological outlook of political
Zionism.
The Palestinian presence had to be addressed for the
second time in the aftermath of the June 1967 war because of
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (the Golan
Heights do not play a direct role here) . Today approximately
1.5 million Palestinians are subjected to Israeli military
rule in the West Bank and Gaza. This Palestinian population
is denied any form of genuine political expression.
Palestinians have no rights under a system of martial law and
are denied rights accorded to people under military occupation
by the Geneva Convention.
Chomsky notes that although Israel considers itself a
Western style democracy such a notion is contradictory because
the "Jewishness" of the state is "built into the institutional
structure and ideology in a fundamental manner and is subject
14to little internal challenge or debate." Chomsky points out
that there is no fundamental difference between the Likud and
Labour Parties with regard to the Occupied Territories. Both
intend to control the areas. Both have been rejectionist vis-
a-vis negotiations over the future of the territories. The
State of Israel, Chomsky notes, is not the state of its
14 Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War; Essays on the
Current Crisis and How We Got There (New York: Pantheon Books,
1982) p. 241.
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citizens but "the sovereign state of the Jewish people."
Although one sixth of Israeli citizens are non-Jewish, the
state is by law to be Jewish. Security is the basis for this
reality. Chomsky, like Arendt, maintains that rejection and
denial of the Palestinians has long been a tenet of political
Zionism.
As a state with undefined borders, Israel has had no
compunction in systematically taking control of land and
resources in the West Bank and Gaza. A process of land and
resource expropriation has put 55% of the land and 75% of the
water resources in the West Bank under Israeli control. The
Palestinian population in these two areas stand in the way of
Zionist aspirations to gcquire the land and resources of what
they consider Eretz Israel. Thus the Palestinians are
identified simply as barriers to the accomplishment of the
territorial objectives of political Zionism. In this sense
they could be seen as the "superfluous" people Arendt wrote
of as being so vulnerable to state violence. Their mere
presence is considered a problem.
The Israeli occupation regime in the West Bank and Gaza
has carried out the de facto annexation of land for the
15 Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1987) p. 377.
1
6
Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Economic Consequences of the
Occupation," Occupation; Israel Over Palestine , edited by Naseer
H. Aruri (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University
Graduates Press, 1983) p. 177. Also see Middle East Report . May-
June, 1988, p. 26.
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ostensible reason of security. The de facto annexation has
been so thorough that the West Bank as an entity hardly
exists. However, when Menahem Begin was questioned about
creeping annexation, he responded with, "You don't annex your
own country."
The "transfer" solution to the Palestinian presence has
been recently advocated. In 1980, Member of the Knesset
Aharon Yariv (former military intelligence chief and Minister
of Information) said,
There are opinions which advocate that a war
situation be utilized in order to exile 700-800
thousand Arabs. These opinions are widespread.
Statements have been voiced on the matter and also
instruments (apparatuses) have been prepared.
Rehavam Ze'evi, retired General, a fifth generation
sabra, member of Palmach, advisor to Prime Minister Rabin on
terrorism, and former Central Command chief stated in 1989,
I was raised in the Labor movement. My father was
among the leaders of MAPAI and a Histadrut leader.
I have been a member of the Histadrut since the age
of 17. I am a Leftist. All the views I now express
are those of the Labor movement 1 . . .Two peoples can't
live in our land. When they live in one land there
is blood and fire '...To defend the Land of Israel
we need the mountains of Judea and Samaria, the high
ground 1 ... It ' s a matter of strategic depth'... (To
the "Ishmaelites") For the sake of peace, get out
of here, so that our sons don't kill yours. So that
you don't plant bombs in our public squares '.. .When
we were attacked for our ideas a year ago we
answered: everything carried out by Zionism over
17
18
Journal of Palestine Studies . Autumn, 1987.
Davis, op. cit.
. p. 8-9.
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the past 100 years has been precisely that
—
transfer.
In March 1988, General Rafael Eitan assessed the
Palestinian presence as a "security threat" to the Israeli
state. Eitan told the Jerusalem Post: "If war breaks out
and they make trouble, then we'll simply have to deport a
20
million people." In July 1987, Deputy Defense Minister
Michael Dekel (Likud) called for mass expulsions of
Palestinians. Some analysts have characterized the proposed
population transfer option as the "Final Solution" to the
21Palestinian "problem."
Thus, the forced transfer option is an idea taken
seriously within policy making circles. In "extremist"
circles, expulsion is readily advocated.
Rabbi Meir Kahane elected to the Knesset in 1984, openly
calls for the forced transfer of 2 million Palestinians
including those within the 1949 "Green Line." Kahane' s Kach
Party has forged an alliance with the extremist Gush Emunim
settlements in the West Bank. Kahane points out that the
logic of transfer is inherent in Zionist philosophy (he cites
Weitz and Ben-Gurion) . The Kach Party uses religious
justification for advocating transfer. Kahane writes,
19 MERIP, March-April, 1989, p. 21.
20 Palestine Focus . July-August, 1988, p. 5. Cited from
The Jerusalem Post.
21 Ibid . . p. 5.
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The analysis and proposed transfer of Arabs from
Israel that I have set down are not personal views.
They are certainly not political ones. This is the
Jewish outlook, based on halakah the law as
postulated in the Torah.
Kahane likens the Palestinians to a cancer: "They are
becoming a cancer in our body... They are waiting for the
23
moment to hit us." Kahane sees the Jewish state as an
organic unit threatened by the presence of people who by his
definition have no right to live in the territory of
Palestine. Although Kahane is considered an extremist his
prescription for the security of the Zionist state is not
contradictory with mainstream Zionist tenets (ideology as
expressed by Herzl, Weitz, Yariv, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion)
.
According to recent polls, transfer as a "solution" to
the security dilemma facing the Israeli state is supported by
24
almost half the Israeli population. Expulsion is seen as a
means of maintaining a Zionist society. Approximately 30% of
the population supports relinquishing the Occupied
Territories; however, it is important to note that very few
Israelis support the establishment of an independent
22 Meir Kahane, They Must Go (New York: Grosset and Dunlap,
1981) p. 267.
•
23 Ibid
.
,
p. 22.
24 Journal of Palestine Studies . Winter, 1989, "The Transfer
Option," p. 161. Reprint of article in Jerusalem Post ,
International Edition, August 20, 1988. Also see MERIP, May-June,
1988, for polls.
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Palestinian state. Most of the 30% still insist on the
Jordanian option.
Although there are different views within the realm of
political Zionism, the reader will see that when it comes to
what constitutes state security, there is a great deal of
unity. Very few political Zionists recognize Palestinian
self-determination as a legitimate right.
Michael Jansen has described four general schools of
25 . • •Zionist ideology. The first is messianically based Zionism
which is a reaction against the assimilationist tendencies
brought about during and following the Age of Enlightenment.
The objective of messianic Zionism was to preserve the
distinctiveness of the Jewish people. Rabbi Kook, the father
of modern messianic Zionism, emigrated to Jaffa in 1904 and
began preparing for the "end of days." Kook ' s doctrines of
Land, Tora, and People form the basis of the contemporary Gush
Emunim movement.
Messianic militarism was, according to Michael Jansen,
disoriented by the debate on Lebanon (1982) . Jansen sees
Israeli society as polarized on the issues of security, the
ultra-nationalists vs. those supporting a smaller Israel.
The second political Zionist ideology is a combination
of liberal and enlightened messianic thought. This school of
25 . .Michael Jansen, Dissonance in Zion (London: Zed Books,
1987) pp. 4-9. Also see Jansen ' s schematic for Israeli political
parties, pp. 132-136.
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thought is called spiritual Zionism and has both secular and
religious followers. Historically the spiritual Zionists have
been critical of acts against Palestinians, and spiritual
Zionist leaders like Chaim Arlosoroff sought to arrive at some
level of cooperation and understanding with the Palestinian
community. Arlosoroff was assassinated by Revisionist
Zionists due to his efforts at forging links with
Palestinians. Today spiritual Zionists are, in general,
supportive of a withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, and
a return to the 1967 borders. Some members support the
Jordanian option, and a few support a two state solution.
Generally followers of spiritual Zionism are on the political
left. Mezvinsky notes the marginal role played by
humanitarian Zionists like Martin Buber and Judah Magnes, each
of whom influenced some Israelis. Ultimately, they were
rejected outright in favor of Ben-Gurion's version of Zionism.
In contrast to Ben-Gurion, Magnes and Buber advocated the
establishment of a democratic binational state in Palestine.
The third Zionist typology is the democratic-socialist
or labour Zionist ideology. The primary concern of the Labour
Zionists was directed towards liberating the Jewish masses
from capitalist exploitation and anti-semitism, and included
a strong reaction against assimilationist tendencies. Large
numbers of Labour Zionists existed within the kibbutzim,
Norton Mezvinsky, "Zionism—Rejection of Dissent: The
Case of Buber and Magnes," The Search , Winter, 1985.
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Histadrut (trade union) and Haganah (military) organizations.
These three organizations were the foundational institutions
for the new Jewish state. Although socialism played a role
in economic organizational matters it was not a concept of
socialism extended to non-Jewish communities. Labour party
membership and leadership was and is opposed to an
independent Palestinian state. Labour, despite Hussein's
declaration, still promotes the Jordanian option.
The fourth ideological strain of political Zionism is
the Revisionist school of thought. Revisionism was born in
1922 as a reaction to what some Zionist's perceived to be a
British betrayal, i.e., British withdrawal from commitment to
establishing the Jewish National Home in the whole of
Palestine including Transjordan. Chaim Weizmann and David
Ben-Gurrion were pragmatic in their approach to the problem
and chose to appease the British rather than reject outright
their proposals. Vladimir Jabotinsky rejected any rhetoric,
however pragmatic, which sought to limit the proposed Jewish
state. Jabotinsky organized a guerrilla movement against the
British and the Palestinians. The Revisionists rejected the
UN Partition Plan of November, 1947. However, when the
Haganah secured 82% of Palestine in 1947-1949, and the
remaining 18% in 1967, the Revisionists had reason to be more
satisfied with the situation. Revisionists today belong to
a number of political parties all of which are opposed to
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withdrawing from the Occupied Territories and opposed to
negotiations with the PLO.
Jansen, in Dissonance in Zion , points out that in the
post- 1948 era the four schools of Zionism formed two overall
political groupings. The "spiritual and moderate" messianic
Zionists joined Labour. Militant messianics and the
Revisionists comprised the second grouping. With the election
of Menachem Begin in 1977 the Revisionists came to power.
Since that year Labour has been in a slow state of decline.
While Jansen marks the real ascendancy of the
Revisionists in 1977, Arendt maintains the Revisionist
27ideology has guided the Israeli state since 1944. Arendt
shows the Revisionist prescriptions regarding security
questions to be an inherent part of Labour policies. While
Jansen sees Herzl as a social-democrat, Arendt judges him to
be a Revisionist, more nationalist and socialist. Flapan
contends that the blow to Arab-Jewish rapprochement ended in
1942 with the passage of the Zionist Biltmore Program.
Although basically in agreement with Arendt, Jansen emphasizes
the fact that Labour's close relations with the U.S.
prohibited an outright call for annexation and the creation
of Greater Israel. Jansen' s analysis indicates the use of the
two track policy, one dedicated to diplomatic maneuvers, the
27 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and
Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 1978) p. 131.
Arendt wrote "Zionism Reconsidered" in 1944.
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other to military successes. A more recent example is the
diplomatic appearance of nonannexation of the West Bank and
Gaza. Creeping annexation nevertheless became evident in the
Allon Plan.
Arendt points out the significance of the 1944 World
Zionist Organization's unanimously-adopted resolution calling
for a Jewish state which would "embrace the whole of
28Palestine, undivided and undiminished." Arendt marks this
as a decisive turning point towards Jabotinsky's Revisionist
Zionism and hence a severe defeat for Zionists who thought
some accommodation with the Palestinians could be reached.
The turn to Revisionist Zionism in 1944 could be marked as
the point at which the Zionist leadership decided to rule out
any form of non-exclusive political program.
Arendt traces the Revisionist ideology to Herzl's version
of nationalism and its most important element—the ideological
prescription of transfer called for with regard to the
Palestinian presence. Revisionist Zionism claims all of
Palestine and TransJordan as exclusively Jewish territories.
29Accordingly, Palestinians should be expelled to Iraq. The
ideological prescription of expulsion as an option within the
overall framework of political Zionism has been identified as
an issue of national security. In order to have a Jewish
28 Ibid . . p. 131.
^ Ibid . . p. 134, 136.
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state, to preserve an exclusively Jewish democracy, the state
of Israel cannot allow more than 15% of its citizens to be
non-Jews. Internal security is thus defined and governed by
the basic demographic tenets of political Zionism.
Beit-Hallahmi ' s analysis of political Zionism maintains
that it has always had right-wing orientations towards the
Palestinians and the so-called Third World. The Revisionist
security prescriptions have been a part of political Zionism
all along. Beit-Hallahmi maintains the Labour Zionists
throughout the 1950' s and 1960 's pursued policies commensurate
with the Political Zionist conceptualization of security.
Beit-Hallahmi writes:
But Zionism has clear, inescapable ideological
implications in terms of dealing with the Third
World. Zionism meant the creation of Jewish
sovereignty in Palestine through settlement and
political domination. Thus by definition it entails
an attack on the indigenous population, and a
confrontation with the Third World.
Beit-Hallahmi goes on to explain Israeli reactionary policies:
The idea of liberation for Third World groups
threatens the very essence of Zionism. Concepts of
human rights are too dangerous for the Israeli
political system. Any serious examination of
Israeli policies in the Third World must inevitably
lead to a radical critique of Zionism and its
political aims. This explains why such an
examination is not likely to be undertaken in Israel
or to gain following there '...If you start talking
about equality, liberation and self-determination,
you will soon encounter a problem: you must then
consider these ideals in the relationship between
Israel and the Palestinians. Small wonder, then,
30 Beit-Hallahmi, op. cit. , p. 229.
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that Israel is opposed to liberation movements in
the Third World.
According to this description, political Zionism is such
that it has no room for even considering the rights of the
non-Jewish population. Political Zionism establishes an
asymmetrical relationship with outsiders.
The relationship between Israeli external and internal
policy is shown by Beit-Hallahmi 's analysis of Shimon Peres 1
1959 request to France to lease French Guiana for use as a
colonial resource:
This strange exemplary tale of modern colonialism
reflects a certain way of seeing the world and of
seeing people in the world. In a sense, the Peres
Guiana plan is a replay of the Zionist plan in
Palestine. It is identical with nineteenth-century
colonialization schemes for Africa and South
America. From the Zionist point of view, Palestine
in the late nineteenth century was an empty
wasteland, waiting to be "developed" and changed.
The country—along with the natives if there were
any—was simply a natural resource to be exploited,
an element of nature. The natives were not part of
the Peres plan. They were not even mentioned.
Likewise the natives of Palestine had no place in
the Zionist vision. Their existence and their
rights were simply not part of the equation. It is
this worldview that Peres was extending in South
America, in his vision for the future of Guiana.
It is the same worldview that Israeli leaders extend
to the Third World of today. 32
Beit-Hallahmi s study indicates that the manner in which
political Zionism relates to the external world is
commensurate with the way it operationalizes its ideas
31 Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid . . p. 231.
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internally. Like Beit-Hallahmi, Maxime Rodinson holds the
colonial-settler nature of political Zionism responsible for
Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, but some scholars
(Adam) have suggested that the Israeli state is not colonial
because there is no temporary mandate, protectorate or
colonial quality to the Israeli presence. Instead the Israeli
presence is permanent.
In order to carry out the principles expressed by
political Zionism, the state has been embroiled in conflict,
an adversarial relationship with the Palestinian population
and Arab neighbors. Israeli society has become militarized.
The pervasive concern for security based on political
Zionism has had logical results:
Military victory created the new state; and, like
Sparta or Prussia, on military virtue it remained
based. The militarization of life and mind
represented not only a break with humanist Zionism,
but with the long history of Judaism. The Zeitgeist
of twentieth-century Central anji Eastern Europe, had
won out over Jewish tradition.
The Zeitgeist referred to here is that of Revisionist
Zionism. Jansen contends that the "military virtue" was
primarily a means of unifying the people and expanding the
state; it was not primarily an organization limited to
defensive requirements. The "task of Zionism" (expansion)
33 Michael Jansen, op. cit. . p. 27. Jansen cites Hans Kohn,
an authority on modern nationalism. Kohn evaluates Israeli
nationalism as based on military virtues. Kohn was a spiritual
Zionist who left Palestine before the declaration of the Israeli
state. Kohn's article, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea" in The
Menorah Journal , Autumn-Winter, 1958, is the source of this quote.
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was unfinished in 1949 and still is to this day. Jansen's
analysis has the Israeli state embarking on a two track policy
in the post 1949 era. One track consisted of diplomacy and
conciliation while the other was the building up of the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) . Leaders of both tracks were
dedicated to the same goals through different means. Security
for the state of Israel was expressed by Jabotinsky's "Iron
Wall" doctrine—essentially a fortress state. In order to
create the fortress state Ben-Gurion removed military issues
from the political arena and made them autonomous concerns of
state security. Yoram Peri contends that,
Zionist ideology '.. .has as one of its major
components military self-reliance or, in the phrase
of Max Nordau, a follower of Herzl, 'muscular
Judaism. ' Thus security was raised to the level of
ideology and sanctified, the Army made a symbol of
identification and glorification a 'supreme
value.
'
34
The 1967 victory once and for all established the
centrality of security in Israeli life, the IDF was the
institutional benefactor. The IDF's relationship to the
Occupied Territories is expressed by Jansen:
An ideological army bound to the major tenets of
Zionism, the IDF could not but devise a policy,
contrary to international law, of changing the
status quo in the occupied territories in order to
secure them for Israel. The policy it devised
involved acquisition by settlement; it was embodied
in the Allon Plan which envisioned military
34 Ibid
.
,
p. 28-31.
50
settlements in "security zones" as a first stage
absorption programme?5
In the post 1967 era Israelis committed to traditional
Zionist ideology demanded the extension of Israeli sovereignty
over the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank and Gaza were,
soon after the 1967 war, subjected to "disguised annexation"
under the command of General Dayan. The areas were carefully
integrated with infrastructures behind the Green Line in hope
of preventing any future repatriation of the territory.
Nevertheless there were and still are problems to this policy;
Uri Davis points out how the security situation became greatly
complicated in the Zionist view after the 1967 war due to the
presence of 1.3 million Palestinians. However, Davis contends
that in the post-1967 era, Israel's "war initiative" is
restricted, making it more difficult to orchestrate a large
forced expulsion under the cover of battle. However, as
stated earlier, Israeli polls show approximately half the
population in support of "transfer." Ideologically it is a
view many Israelis support whether comfortably or not.
The elevation of security to an ideological plane has
been operationalized by the Israeli Defense Forces and
security forces. Political Zionism is synonymous (in the
Zionist perspective) with Jewish security. The role that
3«s
Ibid . . p. 40-41.
Davis, op. cit. , p. 65.
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ideology plays in the Israeli conceptualization of security
was articulated by General Israel Tal:
It was always self-evident, a universal truth that
power is synonymous with independence and statism.
But we always perceived security not as an
independent entity but as an organic part of a
larger complex of values and aims.
Baruch Kimmerling states that "the Israeli social system
has undergone a process of adaptation to the external conflict
38through partial routinization." Such routinization includes
two points:
1. The development of a mentality which perceives the
conflict as a permanent condition or destiny of
society.
2. The creation of built-in social mechanisms and
institutional arrangements for coping with conflict
at maximum efficiency and minimum cost.
Eliezer Schweid suggests these factors require the
"mobilization of all the forces of existence in order to
40 ....
exist." Thus, exclusively Jewish security is the central
theme for the state and populace under political Zionism.
Shavit maintains that the manner in which ideology
influences the national policy of Likud is key to
understanding security issues in Israeli politics. Shavit
suggests that a transformation of Israeli politics took place
37 Lissak, op. cit. . p. 11. General Tal expresses the
ideological aspect of the military as an enforcer of security.
38 Kimmerling, op. cit. . p. 13.
39 Ibid . , p. 13-14.
40 Ibid . . p. 14.
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upon the election of the Likud Party after many years of
Labour Party government
.
Shavit contends that national policy in Israel is shaped
by "the rather unique combination within the Zionist Israeli
context of national-historical concepts, foreign and security
41policy, and settlement policy." Shavit points out that
ideology is the basis of action; at the same time ideology is
often the tool of rationalizing certain acts. Ideology can
both determine acts and rationalize acts after they have been
carried out. In 1977, for the first time Likud leaders
(Herut-Revisionism) got the chance to implement their policies
as they saw fit. But Shavit, unlike Arendt, does not think
Revisionism in security affairs has always been an integral
part of political Zionism.
The most important aspect of Likud centers on the land
of Israel, "Arabs were seen not only as a political enemy but
42
as a metaphysical, existential one." Palestinian presence
on territory claimed by the tenets of political Zionism meant
they would either have to be excluded from equal participation
41 ...Yaacov Shavit, "Ideology World View and National Policy:
The Case of the Likud Government, 1977-1984," The Jerusalem Journal
of International Relations . 9/2, 1987, p. 102. Shavit defines
ideology as "certain declared political and social opinions, to a
well-defined formulated systematic group of goals and aims (the
value dimension) as well as the means and methods for attaining
them (the operative dimension)." Worldview (Weltanschauung) is a
system of symbols and values, historical factors, visions of the
future, all of which "nurture" ideology. Policy is the translation
of ideology into action.
42 Ibid . , p. 105.
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in the political system or forcibly removed as a means of
altering the demographic picture of the area. From 1977 on,
Revisionist Zionism was modified somewhat to a more religious
orientation of messianic Zionism—the language of messianic
Zionism was used. Begin was caught between Revisionism and
its bluntness vis-a-vis security and borders, and its new
messianic language, and the necessity of conducting pragmatic
politics requiring sophisticated tactical and strategic
maneuvers. Likud, as Labour had done in the past, was forced
to be pragmatic in the policy struggle to accomplish
ideological goals. The blunt language of annexation was not
officially used; nevertheless political "facts" (settlement)
on the ground marched ahead.
Ben-Yehuda and Averbach conducted an analysis of conflict
attitudes on the part of Menachim Begin and Moshe Dayan and
found five ideological tenets frequently articulated by the
two leaders:
1. No negotiations between Israel and the PLO;
2. No independent Palestinian state;
3. No foreign sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza
Region;
4. United Jerusalem to remain the capital of Israel;
and
5. Israeli settlements throughout the entire land of
Israel. 4d
43 . .Joel Beimn, "Israel: The Political Economy of a
Garrison State and Its Future," The Next Arab Decade: Alternative
Futures , edited by Hisham Sharabi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988)
p. 241.
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These five postulates form a cohesive normative approach that
rules out the option of rapprochement with the PLO and serves
as an ideological guide for policy formation on the
Palestinian issue.
Israel Shahak contends that in order for Israel to
enforce the principles of political Zionism, it must implement
harsh policies.
Shahak bluntly defines Israeli society as having many
totalitarian features and maintains these features are
actually strongest in the Labour party. Shahak cites security
laws, the predominant role of the military in Israeli society,
and treatment of the Palestinians as examples of
44totalitarianism.
Shahak contends that Israel is preparing to expel large
numbers of Palestinians. In order to accomplish this, the
Israeli media are preparing the public for the eventual
"necessity" of expulsion. Shahak contends this move towards
expulsion is being gradually introduced through the media in
the same way the public was incrementally exposed to the idea
45
of invading Lebanon in 1982. According to Shahak, Israeli
authorities can contemplate such actions because the state is
not democratic in the full sense of the word.
44 Israel Shahak, "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada," Race
and Class , 30/1, 1988, p. 1.
Israel Shahak, Middle East International , 23. September
1988.
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The implementation of certain policies leads observers
to determine what kind or type of regime exists in a given
nation-state. Richard Falk, writing in 1979 determined Israel
to be pre-authoritarian. Israel Shahak contends that Israel's
leadership has strong totalitarian tendencies from the
socialization they received under the dictatorial systems of
Tsarist Russia, Rumania and East Europe. These regimes
offered no models of democratic government. Joel Beinin
categorizes Israel as a garrison state wherein the IDF (Israel
Defense Forces) have "always been a central institution in
46Israeli society." Kimmerling's analysis shows a mentality
in Israel which perceives "conflict as a permanent condition
or destiny of society" which leads "to the need to mobilize
47 .
all the forces of existence." Peri contends that Israel's
ideologically-oriented armed forces combine elements present
in communist and professional military forces. The security
and military forces were dominated by Labour party members
until 1977 when it became evident that Labour was losing
influence. Clearly ideological factors play a guiding role
48 .in Israel's military forces. Lissak maintains there are no
significant boundaries between the defense and civilian
46 . . .Joel Beinin, "Israel: The Political Economy of a
Garrison State and Its Future," The Next Arab Decade: Alternative
Futures edited by Hisham Sharabi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988)
p. 241.
47 Lissak, op. cit. , p. 13.
48 Ibid . . p. 46.
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sectors in Israel. Some authors, Perlmutter and Horowitz,
agree that there is a very close relationship and overlapping
between Israeli civilian and military sectors but to them this
49does not connote militarism or less democracy. However,
Kimmerling points out that democracy in Israel applies to
Jewish citizens, hence the application of a generalization
about democracy in Israel is limited. Evidence shows that
the democratic pluralistic structures and attributes of the
Israeli system exist for only a narrowly defined group of
people. Thus there are, essentially, two Israeli regimes.
One pertaining to full, citizens and one pertaining to people
who come under the governance of the state but have no rights.
Security Policies in the Occupied Territories
Shavit has defined policy as "the practical translation
of ideology." The previous analysis of political Zionism
indicates that both the Labour and Likud Parties share the
same ideological conclusions with regard to security.
However, they have different policy approaches to accomplish
basically the same end. The ideological prescription of
securing the land of Israel is central to Israeli state
policy. Shavit suggests that worldview and ideology, although
related, differ in the sense that similar worldviews can be
expressed differently by different people, while ideology is
more precise. In the previous section, we examined what
49 Ibid . . p. 43.
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political Zionism specifies for the Palestinians. At this
point it is necessary to see whether, and if so how, these
prescriptions translated into operationalized policies. This
entails looking at the regime in place in the Occupied
Territories. Once certain ideological prescriptions are
revealed it is then necessary to see if they are mere rhetoric
and thus potentialities or whether in fact they have been
translated into acts.
Kimmerling found that most political and sociological
analyses tend to overlook the inhabitants of the Occupied
Territories because the areas are not yet de jure parts of
Israel and military occupation and governance have not
formally been announced as permanent. However, one could
question the efficacy of studying Israel while ignoring the
territories based on the following facts: (1) the occupation
has been in place for a long time; (2) it has been accompanied
by land and resource expropriation on a wide scale; (3) it is
seen as part of Eretz Israel in terms of Zionist ideology; (4)
it has been integrated economically; and (5) is thought of as
being under the general security and strategic umbrella of the
50Israeli state. Thus if one limits one's study to Israeli
pluralistic democracy a great deal about the state is ignored
because attention is focused primarily on a parliamentary
system wherein political pluralism is overwhelmingly in the
Kimmerling, Ibid . , p. 35.
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hands of the elected representatives of the Jewish population.
Indeed, democracy is present with the system, but has been
established primarily for one segment of the population.
It is worthwhile to examine the Israeli regime in the
Occupied Territories and check to see whether tenets of
political Zionism are translated into security policies.
Martial law based on the 194 5 Defense Emergency
Regulations subjects all Palestinians in Israel (this was the
Israel of the 1949 Armistice boundaries) and the Occupied
Territories to military government. In reference to martial
law, Davis comments, "The characterization of the state of
Israel as being permanently in a state of emergency is not
only a political statement but perhaps more significantly, a
51legal statement." From 7 June 1967 to the present, Martial
Law has been imposed on the West Bank and Gaza. The Golan
Heights (1981), East Jerusalem and surrounding areas (1967,
1973) have been annexed by the State of Israel. Creeping
annexation from 1967 to the present has resulted in the
annexation of 52-55% of the West Bank and 30-34% of Gaza.
While Israeli civil law (extended to the Occupied Territories
in 1967) applies to settlers it is martial rule, except on
rare occasions, which applies to the non-citizen Palestinian
population (1.5 million). As seen earlier, both people and
land have been subject to the impact of military rule. The
Davis, op. cit. , p. 64.
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annexation of land is first and foremost justified on security
grounds
.
The West Bank is occupied by two brigades and collateral
forces all under the centralized command of the military-
governor. Executive, legislative and judicial authority is
implemented by decree issued by the military governor and his
staff. Policies are made by the governor and carried out by
his staff officers. Some 1,100 decrees have been issued by
52the military government.
The military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza can be
evaluated in terms of the following distinct periods, 1967-
1977; 1977-1987, and 1987 to the present. During each period,
there were turning points towards harsher repression and more
extensive land expropriation and the conseguent Palestinian
reaction by protesting and demonstrating.
The first stage of occupation was dominated by the
53policies of Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defense. Dayan
thought the Palestinian community could be co-opted and
pacified through a sophisticated policy which on the one hand
granted some forms of local autonomy, and on the other, was
52 Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Proiect (Washington,
DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1984) p. 24, and The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) p. 37.
53 . •Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians
and the West Bank (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1987) For a description of the periods of differing
Israeli rule.
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sharply repressive against those who refused to conform to
Israeli rule. Dayan's policies were not successful in
containing or eliminating Palestinian nationalism and this
was clearly evident by the mid-1970 's. During 1970-1971, there
was a short-lived armed rebellion in Gaza utilizing caches of
arms left by the Egyptians. The Commander at the time,
General Sharon carried out a harsh pacification operation in
Gaza to put down the rebellion. Despite a major crackdown on
the Palestine National Front in Spring, 1974, the Israeli
military government could not prevent the widespread
expression of nationalism through demonstrations. Dayan was,
however, successful in completing the economic subordination
of the Occupied Territories to Israel. For all practical
purposes, there ceased to be a distinction between the two
economies. Land expropriation on security grounds and for the
purposes of Israeli settlement incrementally increased during
these years. By 1973, the ideas of invisible occupation
contemplated in Dayan's policies (1967-1973) were no longer
invisible. The relative calm of 1967-1973 is evident by the
statement of an Israeli reservist:
Up to 1973, you could spend your army service in
the West Bank sitting and drinking coffee, lean yoirr
rifle against the wall and chat with the locals."
After 1973, a permanent state of low-intensity warfare existed
in the Occupied Territories.
54 Journal of Palestine Studies , Autumn, 1987.
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The election of pro-PLO mayors in 1976 indicated the
widespread popularity of nationalism. The relative calm of
the 1967-1973 era was largely due to the pro-Hashemite, non-
nationalist orientations of older Palestinian community
leaders. However, the rise of a nonviolent
protest/demonstration movement with networks throughout the
territories soon discredited any notion of maintaining the
status quo. The Land Day (March 31, 197 6) protest within the
Green Line and in the Occupied Territories was met with
Israeli gunfire which left six demonstrators dead. After
1976, the use of shootings at demonstrations became an ever-
increasing response on the part of the Israeli military and
security forces. The Land Day protest of 1976 marks a point
at which the Israeli military and security forces thought
force would crush the increasing rise of nationalism.
The increasing despair under the impact of land
expropriation was enhanced in 1979 when Israel declared most
of the West Bank territory "state lands" and made it available
for settlement.
In 1977, according to Aruri, it became apparent to the
military regime that the Palestinian community was
overwhelmingly in favor of resistance and would not be
contained or co-opted by the policies of Dayan. Prime
Minister Begin immediately implemented the "iron fist" policy
in the Occupied Territories. Repression and severe violations
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of Human Rights increased dramatically. The Christian
Science Monitor reported that attacks on writers, students and
demonstrators were accompanied by indiscriminate mass
punishments, curfews, school closings, banishment of families,
and public humiliations. The Jalazone refugee camp was put
under total curfew for twelve days. It is important to take
note that the "Iron Fist" policy went hand in hand with the
Camp David process.
Aronson marks 1979 as the beginning of a new and more
severe crackdown on the Palestinian communities. The
crackdown on Bir Zeit University and Bethlehem University were
notable turning points towards harsher military actions.
Clashes between settlers and Palestinians were common
occurrences. Aronson contends that the "Iron Fist" policy was
implemented in mid-1980 in conjunction with a policy of
annexing land more rapidly in order to satisfy internal
political forces demanding the extension of Israeli
sovereignty. By 1980, it was again clear that no Palestinian
leadership could be created to support the autonomy plan of
Begin and the Camp David Accords. General Eitan, Chief of
Staff, and other military officers,
saw the occupied territories as a battleground to
be won, and had no sense that Israel would benefit
from a political solution to the problems of its
rule.. In their view, the problems of the West Bank
55 Naseer Aruri, op. cit. , p. 15.
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and Gaza Strip were military problems, requiring
the use of military power.
Instructions were given to soldiers to attack and beat
curfew violators and "...if someone causes trouble, throws
stones or something, first break his bones and then put him
on the vehicle that will take him to the military
57 ...headquarters." Upon release from detention, Palestinians
were given memos in Hebrew for presentation to IDF patrols
58
which read, "Hit him and let him pass." Aronson reports
that one observer of the shootings of 16 students at Bir Zeit
University was convinced of the "widely held view that the
military government was doing more to provoke unrest than to
59 .
contain it." Evidence from films showing Israeli troops on
rooftops firing on students throwing stones indicates the
clearly aggressive intentions of Israeli troops. The
repressive policies intensified in the post-1977 era in
incremental stages to 1982 when Israeli forces confronted
demonstrators with lethal force on a daily basis. The West
Bank military commander ordered troops:
re
Aronson, op. cit. , p. 214.
57 .Ibid . . p. 216. For descriptions of Israeli treatment of
Palestinians see entire section.
58 Ibid . , p. 216.
59 Ibid . . p. 223.
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to shoot at solar water heaters, break watches, to
assemble passersby or people outside their, homes in
groups of six or eight to beat them up."
Palestinians were forced to sing the Israeli national anthem
or shout insults at one another. Busloads of people were
driven out far from their homes and then made to walk home.
One soldier explained to a journalist that his role while on
patrol was to "instill fear" in the local populace. His job
included forcing children in school yards to play and not
stand around in groups. He revealed that oral orders for
arrests were common procedure. Widespread indiscriminate
beatings were becoming routine in early 1982. (General Orr
gave written instructions authorizing "punishments.") Aronson
reports that the Israeli command wanted to provoke a conflict
and used vigilante settlers as one means of accomplishing this
objective. Clashes between settlers and the local Palestinian
populace became more and more intense commensurate with the
impact of creeping annexation and waves of harsh crackdowns
ordered by the military authorities. Apparently a premature
rebellion would offer the chance for mass arrests and to
preempt growing resistance.
The Palestinian protest in the Spring of 1982 was largely
a reaction of resistance against the increasingly severe form
of military occupation manifested by the Iron Fist policies.
Military officers in the West Bank and Gaza referred to the
Ibid . . p. 282.
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inhabitants as "local bacteria;" General Orr (IDF Commander
of the West Bank) spoke of the Arabs as valuing life less than
others; soldiers in the Mapam Party received briefings "that
would not shame a fascist military regime," and Prime Minister
Begin referred to PLO commandos as "two-legged beasts of prey
fii
who are thirsting for Jewish blood." All Palestinians were
seen as potential "two-legged beasts of prey." By the end of
Spring 1982, Palestinian sources reported twelve Palestinians
killed and over two hundred injured. Israeli sources reported
two soldiers killed, thirty-three injured. No demonstrations
in the post 1967 period had been as intense as those of Spring
1982.
Israeli security sources claimed that a large number of
injured would result in the disintegration of demonstrations
and the realization on the part of the Palestinians that the
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costs of dissent are too high. The initial implementation
of state terror as a policy by security forces can be traced
back to the collapse of Dayan's co-optation policies and the
consequent increased visibility of the occupying forces. Once
it became obvious that Sharon and Begin 's Civilian
Administration (established in 1981 alongside the Military
Government) was incapable of producing a non-nationalistic
"local autonomy" leadership the military responded with
Ibid . . p. 290.
Ibid . . p. 291-293.
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increased repression. The complete failure of the Civil
Administration was evident by 1982. General Sharon stated in
reference to the 1982 disturbances, "Our actions should be
viewed as yet another phase in a continuous struggle as part
CO
of a farsighted plan...." The demonstrations of 1982 cannot
be understood without considering Lebanon. The plan Sharon
spoke of above was revealed in summer 1982 as the invasion of
Lebanon, an action designed to eliminate the PLO. Sharon
proudly referred back to his "pacification operation" in Gaza
during 1970-1971 as a basis for the invasion of Lebanon and
the crackdown on the Occupied Territories. The Gaza rebellion
of 1970-1971 was armed, but of small scale and qualitatively
different when compared to the widespread unarmed
demonstration of 1982. From 1976 on, the Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories began to express large scale resistance
to the occupation. No longer were they waiting on liberation
from the outside. The popular political challenge to Israeli
presence clearly dominated the scene in 1982. However, the
demonstrations were mostly uncoordinated and spontaneous
popular reactions to intensified repression. Sharon viewed
the challenge as war. The situation in Lebanon was integrally
related to Israeli security interests in the West Bank and
Gaza. Hence Sharon insisted on trying to destroy the PLO in
Ibid . , p. 293.
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Lebanon as a means of securing the Occupied Territories and
with the aim of destroying Palestinian nationalism.
The Israeli failure to totally crush the PLO and
establish a Christian Phalangist-dominated Lebanon did not
signal a change in Israeli policies in the Occupied
Territories.
Although the "Iron Fist" policy was already in place,
Defense Minister Rabin announced on 4 August 1985 a more
intensified version which included increased usage of the
following practices: detention up to six months without
charges or trial (renewable) ; deportation; town arrest, house
sealings and demolitions; closure of institutions,
organizations and schools.
By November 1986 former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron
Benvenisti, author of The West Bank Data Project , concluded
that the status quo of military occupation in the West Bank
and Gaza would not change. According to Benvenisti time had
run out for any hope of reconciliation.
The level of repression had increased greatly between
1982 and 1987. Bir Zeit and Bethlehem Universities were
particular targets of the Israeli military. Students were
frequently subjected to lethal shootings. The IDF
increasingly employed battlefield tactics against
demonstrations and protests. Stones, placards, flags,
slogans, and mass demonstrations by school age youth and
university students were the enemy. The December 1986
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shooting of Bir Zeit University students touched off massive
waves of demonstrations and protests in the Spring of 1987.
On 28 October 1987 at Bethlehem University, an Israeli officer
and sniper identified a protest leader, Abu Surur, and shot
him from a nearby rooftop with a 22mm sniper rifle. Israeli
64forces prevented ambulances from attending to victims.
It is interesting to note that some evidence indicates
there was, in 1985, Jordanian collusion with Israel's
crackdown on nationalists in the Occupied Territories. Upon
the initiation of Rabin's "Iron First" policy in August 1985
there appeared to be coordination between Israel and Jordan
regarding Jordan's proposed $1.2 billion development plan for
the Occupied Territories, Jordan's short-lived agreement with
Arafat, and Israel's crackdown in the Occupied Territories.
In 1985, Hussein cracked down severely on PLO supporters in
Jordan. This may have been a last effort to impose some sort
65
of Israeli-Jordanian solution to the conflict. Some
Palestinian nationalists suspect Jordan and Israel secretly
coordinate their policies in hopes of eliminating Palestinian
nationalism.
Starting in December 1987, the Palestinian community was
in a position to challenge the occupation in a coordinated,
sustained, and widespread manner. Throughout 1987, the
64
Middle East International , December 19, 1987.
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situation in Gaza and the West Bank was characterized by
intense clashes between primarily young Palestinians and the
occupying forces. Initially, the clashes in Gaza were the
most violent. In Gaza, after the head of the military police
was assassinated (2 August) , curfews and travel bans were
imposed. By the end of Spring 1987, seven Palestinians had
been killed, scores wounded, and hundreds detained. Israeli
settlers were allowed to go on a rampage, breaking into
houses, beating youths and "terrorizing the population" in
West Bank areas, all in "retaliation" for stone throwing along
fifithe highways. The Jerusalem Press Daily from the Occupied
Territories (9 February 88) reports that on 1 October 1987,
it became "habit" for both the occupation army and Israeli
Settlers to murder Palestinians. Nine Palestinians, eight of
whom were from Gaza, were shot by IDF troops and settlers
between 1 October 1987 and 8 December 1987. On October 6,
1987, a shootout in Gaza left four Palestinians and one
Israeli intelligence officer dead. The underlying causes of
rising violence in 1987 are accounted for in the following
passage:
Underlying both the tumultuous autumn and the
somnolent summer is the steady erosion of individual
Palestinian and collective rights. This has become
a structural feature of the occupation. There may
be a year when the universities are not closed, a
period when deportation ceases as a practice.
Sometimes freedom' of expression or assembly can
surpass the occupiers' formal constraints. But the
unsolved contradictions between Israel's colonial
66 MERIP, January-February, 1988, p. 3.
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project and Palestinian nationalism lead almost
inevitably to mounting systemic violations (land
confiscation, takeover of infrastructure) and
individual abuses. The passage of time lends a
further dynamic, what Meron Benvenisti calls "the
significance of routine." The current phase, the
"iron fist" policy introduced in August 1985, has
brought a substantial increase in clear cut human
rights violations. One of the more striking is this
routinization of repression.
Amnesty International recognized in 1987 the increasingly
violent actions of the military occupation forces and
expressed througout that year its concerns.
Prior to the recent uprising, the Arab Studies Society
(Jerusalem) published a report on the steady increase of
violence on the part of the IDF over the years just prior to
1987. The report warned that "1987 may prove to be as bloody
CO
as 1982" in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. On 9 December
1987, the recent uprising "began" when a Palestinian was shot
by Israeli troops during a funeral for four Palestinians
killed on 8 December 1987 by an Israeli truck driver who
rammed their car at an army roadblock in Gaza.
Types of State Terror in the Occupied Territories
Acts of state terror became routine and widespread on a
continuous basis during the Palestinian uprising which began
in December 1987. The use of state terror in the recent
period can be traced to the Spring 1982 policies of the
Penny Johnson, "The Routine of Repression," MERIP ,
January-February, 1988, p. 4.
68 The Link . 21/3, September, 1988, p. 9.
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military government. Shootings and beatings were routine
methods of responding to dissent, but the employment of such
tactics was increased tremendously in the post-December 1987
period.
This section tests for acts of state terrorism
perpetrated by the Israeli forces in the Occupied Territories.
Evidence in this section is from human rights monitoring
agencies and the acts discussed herein fit the categories of
state terror listed on page 26. Different acts of state
terror are often used together and are therefore inseparable.
Acts such as shooting, beating with clubs, shooting tear gas
in close quarters, sweeping raids on communities, mass
arrests, and the denial of medical care frequently are acts
which are inseparable in the sense that they often take place
together. As an example, a person who has been wounded by
gunshot might be denied medical care or subjected to
harassment in the hospital. In addition, the use of
collective punishments such as curfews cannot be separated
from the impact of troops shooting tear gas into homes from
which people cannot leave for fear of being shot for violating
the curfew. Another example of the relationship between acts
of state terror is that of arrest and prison conditions.
Thus, there is an overlapping of the various acts of state
terror which indicates the intensity of the violence. A
person subjected to one form of state terror may experience
a series of terrors.
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A wide range of different terror acts are committed on
a sustained basis by the military government in the Occupied
Territories. Daoud Kuttab claims that in the first few months
of the current uprising the Israeli authorities experimented
with different methods of crushing the revolt—none of the
measures taken was effective so a "comprehensive two pronged
plan" was put into practice. The first part of the plan
called for an "all out blitz against the entire Palestinian
community" and the second a concentrated effort to break the
political strength of Palestinian nationalists and especially
69the National Unified Command of the Uprising." In order to
accomplish these measures all communications in the
territories were shut down. Links with the outside world were
closed. This made it possible for the IDF to step up the use
of state terror without having to be accountable to
international opinion. State terror is often perpetrated
against people in an offensive manner simply to strike fear
in the hearts and minds of a populace. In fact, military and
security forces often initiate state terror operations.
On 3 April 1988, Defense Minister Rabin admitted many of
the confrontations between the IDF and the Palestinians were
initiated by the IDF. He specifically referred to an incident
in Gaza:
fiQ Middle East International . 2. April 1988, p. 3.
New York Times . "Kissinger Urged Ban on TV Coverage of
Violence," by Robert D. McFadden, 5 March 1988.
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The incident here shows that in order to reach the
goal (of restoring order) we are not just waiting
for violence from the other side, but initiate
actions and teach lessons to those who start
violence. In the majority of incidents, the
confrontations were the result of an initiative,
(which was) partly an effort to ensure a calming of
the situation and to suppress violence. ( The Times ,
4 April 1988)
Defense Minister Rabin stated, "If the Arabs do not keep
quiet, they will find themselves standing on scorched
earth." On 19 January 1988, Rabin gave orders to
Israeli troops which authorized severe and random beatings,
72
"The first priority is to use force, might, beatings."
Rabin's orders ushered in a new era of increasingly severe
physical attacks. The escalation of physical attacks, such
as breaking bones with clubs, is designed to inflict on the
victim a fear of the occupier. Two days after Rabin's
statement, hospitals in Gaza reported 2 00 cases of broken
bones. By January 27, 1,000 serious injuries had been
reported. Injuries throughout the Occupied Territories were
estimated at 2,000 during the period of 9 December 1987 to
73the end of January 1988.
American physicians visiting the Occupied Territories in
February 1988 reported their estimate of total injuries at
In These Times , November 9-15, 1988, p. 11.
72 The Link . 21/3, September 1988, p. 9.
73 Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report ,
(Chicago Office, Louise Cainkar, Contact Person, 17. February 1988)
p. 3.
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33,000 on the West Bank and 5,000 in Gaza. The Physicians for
Human Rights Report of a Medical Fact Finding Mission
determined that the pattern of injuries in Gaza and the West
Bank differed in deliberate ways: changes back and forth from
shootings with bullets to rubber bullets, to mass clubbings,
to the use of gas culminated in different kinds of injuries
over different time periods. It was determined that Gaza was
subjected to attacks designed to produce permanent physical
disabilities. The Physicians For Human Rights 1 February 1988
press conference revealed the attacks were focused on limbs
and midshaft breaks indicating the limb was stretched out and
74
"deliberately smashed to disable." Dr. Geiger of the New
York Medical School reported the delegations witnessed an
"uncontrolled epidemic of violence by the army and police."
A journalist from Reuters reported that new baseball bat-
7fi
sized clubs were issued to Israeli troops.
Evidence from the Physicians for Human Rights, Citizens
Rights Movement, Al-Haq, and Israeli members of the Knesset
(Sarid, Zucker) shows a significant number of injured to have
been attacked not during demonstrations or clashes with
troops, but rather attacked in or near their homes during
raids: Dr. Leaning stated patients in Gaza hospitals, "look
74
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as if they have been mauled. What is impressive is the number
of fractures per patient. . .They would have to hold them down
and just keep beating them." Leaning cites the nature of
attacks as indicating a clear policy and not simply a lack of
control:
That is one of the darker things we saw. These are
not aberrations. It is a pattern that is
controlled, a systematic pattern over a wide
geographical area.
Approximately 38,000 people are estimated to have suffered
physical attacks by Israeli troops. One physician described
what he saw, "If this were a war, much of what we observed
79
would be considered atrocities." Ironically, On 9 February
1988, Defense Minister Rabin attributed the length of the
Palestinian uprising to the "limits imposed on the use of
force by Israel." Rabin denied that there was a policy of
beatings, but acknowledged their occurrence during "hot
pursuit" of demonstrators. Rabin pointed out that the use of
clubbings by military and security forces is not unique to
Israel but that, around the world, "When there is opposition
by force, they do not kiss the demonstrators; they use
clubs." In the one month period between 17 March and 19
April, 60 Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli
77
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soldiers. In contrast, 82 were killed the previous 14 weeks.
Shootings did not decrease and Rabin's orders to use beatings
should be seen as supplementing not replacing gunfire.
The use of "rubber" bullets has not meant a reduction in
serious injuries. One witness (Byron) to the use of rubber
bullets contends that the soldiers simply aim for the head,
eyes, or genitals in order to inflict damage. Rubber bullets
were often used at close range during beatings with clubs.
Jaws and vulnerable body parts were often injured in such a
way. Byron also pointed out the weapons training undergone
by Israeli troops is such that their marksmanship is quite
good and they can easily aim to wound or to kill depending on
their choice. This same witness reported the total number of
deaths from all causes by August, 1988, was over 500; she
notes only confirmed and documented deaths are reported by
80
most media sources. Middle East International reported that
by the end of the first year of the uprising, 298 Palestinians
were killed by shootings: 69 by tear gas, and 2 6 from
81injuries in physical attacks by Israeli troops. Clearly a
majority of the deaths are due to shooting, but many more are
wounded by gunfire. Al-Ittihad Hospital in Nablus treated
80 Interview with Deborah Byron, Human Rights Observer,
Eyewitness Israel Delegation, 3 August 1988, 1st Unitarian Church,
San Diego, California.
81 Middle East International . December 16, 1988.
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823,800 people for gunshot wounds during 1988. Although when
contrasted to shootings, physical attacks have taken fewer
lives, they have been the most widely experienced forms of
state-terror. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency
reported that their clinics in the Occupied Territories
treated 6,000 people for injuries received from clubbings
83during 1988.
In the first week of the uprising (8 December-16
December) over 2 00 serious injuries were documented; eighty
percent due to bullet wounds; over forty percent of the bullet
wounds were to the head, chest or spinal column; 60% to the
arms or legs. "Dumdum" bullets were introduced which explode
on entry and cause excessive tissue damage and disabilities.
Fifty percent of the injured during the first week were 18
years and younger, 10% were women. On 5 January 1988, troops
greatly increased the use of clubbings which resulted in an
. . 84increase in serious injuries.
On 10 January 1988, in Gaza, halftracks were driven
through towns and refugee camps firing randomly; over seventy
85
casualties were inflicted from the gunfire.
82 Palestine Human Rights Newsletter , Vol. 9, No. 1,
January-February, 1989 (Chicago, IL: Palestine Human Rights
Campaign) p. 3.
83 Ibid . . p. 3.
84 Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report , op.
cit. , February 3, 1988, pp. 2-5.
Ibid . , pp. 2-5.
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January 19, 1988, brought Rabin's publicly announced
policy of physical attacks on randomly chosen people. One
Israeli captain said, "You chase anybody you have to and beat
him up, and altogether it works pretty well." By mid-
• 87January the age range of victims was 4 to 7 years of age.
In Ramallah there is even a special wall in a vacant lot which
is a central location for clubbings. Blood is stained on the
wall. 88
Hospitals were special targets for the Shabak (Israeli
security-intelligence service) and IDF troops. Palestinians
quickly learned not to go to hospitals for treatment because
the emergency rooms and patient rooms were subjected to troop
raids armed with clubs and tear gas. Doctors were attacked
and patient lists were confiscated for intelligence records.
Ambulances were routinely prevented from entering sealed off
areas undergoing raids or sweeping attacks by the IDF and
security forces.
While deaths from shootings continued, there was a
dramatic increase in deaths from the use of tear gas. Between
January 12-17, seven people were killed by tear gas, five of
whom were under one year of age. Tear gas was shot through
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windows into close quarters during times of curfews when
people were forced to remain inside their homes for fear of
being shot. Such acts caused 8 fetal deaths between 9
December and 20 February 1988. Many reports on the use of gas
have the common theme of firing gas into homes after
subjecting the residents to physical attacks:
Soldiers. . .threw tear gas canisters inside the old
main house, which caused the suffocation of one year
old infant girl and they went destroying the front
entrances of some houses with clubs and live
bullets.
Gas was often dropped in large quantities from helicopters
hovering over demonstrators. Strange types of gas have been
fired at people. In an affidavit prepared by a Human Rights
Delegation, it was recorded that a 15 year old girl was
strangely affected by a red colored gas shot at her. She
experienced lockjaw and tried to "rip open her chest."
Periodic attacks still inflict her.
Shootings and the use of gas were acts accompanied by a
long time policy of "collective" or "environmental"
punishments which were intended to create hardships such that
there would be a halt to the protests. Entire areas were
sealed off and placed under total curfew without electricity,
water or communications. Food supplies were denied, including
90 For descriptions on the use of gas see: Palestine Human
Rights Informan Center Reports
.
The Jerusalem Press: Daily Report
from the Occupied Territories , Eyewitness Israel Report , December
1988, (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee), Amnesty
International Special Reports, The Link , and The Journal of
Palestine Studies press reports.
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UN supervised relief efforts. Food and relief supplies were
publicly destroyed at roadblocks and checkpoints.
Violent attacks on Palestinian communities by Israeli
settlers were (are) routine. Reports such as the following
are common:
...settlers burst last night into Al-Eizarieh town east
of Jerusalem and attacked residents.
In October of 1988, an article by Yizhar Be'ev in Kol
Ha'Ir exposed the existence of a death squad. In Yatta, two
youths were abducted and killed in what was described by
92
witnesses as a death squad operation.
Injuries experienced by Israelis as of February 10, 1988
were recorded by the IDF Information Department as 122
93
soldiers and border guards and 69 Israeli citizens injured.
Israeli troop strength during the uprising has been increased
5 times the normal size in the Gaza Strip and 3 times the
normal on the West Bank. Between 50,000-100,000 Israeli
94troops are deployed in the Occupied Territories. The
91 The Jerusalem Press: Daily Report from the Occupied
Territories (Washington DC: Jerusalem Press Service, February 10,
1988)
92 ...Journal of Palestine Studies , Winter, 1989, p. 163.
93 Jerusalem Press: Daily Report from the Occupied
Territories , February 10, 1988.
94 Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report , op.
cit. . January 24, 1988. The increase of troop strength was
noticeable. Israel Shahak pointed out soldiers put stickers on
their berets with "born to kill" and "blood" written in Hebrew.
Regular forces are used more than reservists; reservists are older
and less enthusiastic about attacking civilians. For estimated
troop strength, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Lou Douglas Lecture Series,
81
magnitude of government violence in the Occupied Territories
indicates the large number of people affected by the
occupation. Since 1967, 300,000 Palestinians have been
imprisoned in an Israeli jail—almost 20% of the Palestinian
population in the West Bank and Gaza. The International Red
Cross reported an even higher number of 500,000 arrests or
detentions of Palestinians between 1967 and 1982. In 1976
alone, 33,000 Palestinians were detained in mass arrests,
8,000 of whom were charged. By 1987, an estimated 4,100
internal security prisoners were held in Israeli prisons.
This does not include those held in any one of the 58 police
stations. Conditions inside Israeli prisons are a form of
95terror. The first report of torture by Israeli forces was
published in 1968 by the International Committee of the Red
Cross. The second major report came out in 1970 and was
authored by Amnesty International. This report was followed
in 1975 by evidence published by the U.S. Despite the long-
time use of torture it was not until 1977 that the London
Times of June 19, 1977 exposed the widespread torture of
Palestinian prisoners so severe that many have been
permanently debilitated, disfigured or driven insane. A
Kansas State University, April 18, 1989.
95 For detailed evidence of torture, and general prison
conditions see Mideast Monitor 5/1 (Association of Arab-American
University Graduates, 1988) p. 1-4. Amnesty International reports.
London Times (June 19, 1977), International Committee of the Red
Cross . Journal of Palestine Studies .
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special military intelligence center of secret location called
the Palace of Hell was noted for infamous tortures.
In 1977, the Israeli Landau Commission revealed that Shin
Bet (Israeli intelligence) "routinely used physical pressure
and lied about the methods used for obtaining confessions.
This report, in effect, authorized such acts in the name of
"preventing rampant terrorism." In 1980 it was revealed that
a special prison was opened to house prisoners driven insane
by interrogations. Prisoners Halawi and Jafairi were killed
when, after a prolonged hunger strike, Israeli captors jammed
force-feeding tubes down their throats, thus puncturing their
lungs. For many Palestinians, the first prison experience has
been identified as the catalyst for changing a young protestor
96
or demonstrator into a determined fighter. Punamaki studied
the comparative use of torture in South America and by Israel
and found beatings, cold water torture, sexual molestation and
deprivations of food and water were more commonly experienced
by Palestinian detainees than by South American political
prisoners. The psychological trauma of torture was found to
be the same in the two groups of victims. Prisoners have
acquired heroic status and some Palestinians suggest that the
precursor to the current Intifada happened in March, 1987,
when 1,000 prisoners went on a hunger strike. This strike was
Washington Post , January 3, 1988.
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supported by large scale demonstrations throughout the
Occupied Territories.
On 14 April 1988, Israel opened the third Ansar prison
(Ansar III). Some 2,000-3,000 Palestinians were transferred
to Ansar III where they live in tents with open sewers. From
5:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., they are forced to work building the
camp. The prisoners are subjected to beatings, spoiled food,
physical and psychological torture.
Palestinians in the hands of Israeli forces have been
subjected to harassment even by Israeli medical personnel.
The Jerusalem Press Daily Report of 29 January 1988 states
that after a 19 year old youth was shot in the leg and
clubbed, he was deposited at an Israeli hospital whose
administrator asked first for $20,000 then $3,000 for
emergency surgery. After surgery, the patient was handcuffed
and tied to the bed. Two Israeli guards watched over him,
often threatening him when he complained.
Kidnappings by army troops are (were) committed during
raids on communities. Youths would be clubbed then taken by
car and dumped miles away from home.
Another way the Israelis inflict a state of fear in the
population is to demolish houses by dynamite. By order of
the military governor, any house can be demolished as
"punishment," for security reasons, or because proper licenses
for construction or rehabilitation are not held. Demolition
of houses has long been a policy of state terror in the
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Occupied Territories—1,500 houses were demolished between
1967 and 1987; 10,000 people were made homeless. The practice
decreased in the 1977-1985 period under Likud when the
emphasis was on co-opting Palestinians through various
economic "quality of life" programs commensurate with attempts
to create a non-nationalist Palestinian leadership. In 1985,
upon the announcement of a more severe iron fist policy, the
97
use of demolition was revived.
One particularly disturbing form of terror is vigilante
violence. The Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories
are armed and allowed to play a security force role by the
military government. In addition, there is overlapping
membership between settlers and the military. Settlers serve
in the reserve military units. Clashes between armed settlers
and unarmed Palestinians are common occurences; many times the
settlers are on the offensive.
Jewish settlers were allowed by the IDF to rampage
through several cities and towns during the first week of
February, 1988. They attacked and burst into homes firing
live bullets. Furniture, cars, water supplies, and food were
destroyed. Youths were clubbed and kidnapped in what appeared
to be well-organized attacks. Complicity of the military
98governor (General Mitzna) has been indicated.
97 New York Times . June 9, 1987.
98 Jerusalem Press , op. cit. , February 9, 1988.
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The complicity of Israeli military officers has been
documented. The United National Relief and Works Agency
Director for Gaza, Bernard Mills, stated:
I can't stay in Gaza much longer, the strain is too
great. Because we work so intimately with the
refugees, we know what's happening every night that
the army raids a camp. I see the Israeli commander.
I tell him what's taken place. He denies
everything: 'No, these things are not happening.
Our soldiers have orders not to abuse civilians.
Any violation is a minor exception, a temporary
lapse under some unusual provocation.
•
Mills claimed that the most painful part for him is being lied
to outright by Israeli officers. He also pointed out that,
prior to December 9, 1987, Palestinians were routinely beaten
and physically attacked mainly inside police stations; after
December 9, the attacks were public and widespread.
"Something has gone very, very fundamentally wrong here," said
Mills.
The Children's Peace Campaign documents harm done to
children by the Israeli authorities. Karen White has reported
on the abuse of children and that she witnessed "severe
beatings of unarmed children before and during the uprising."
Her reports were delivered to the U.S. Ambassador and to the
House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Between
99 . . .Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (Washington,
DC: American Education Trust, May, 1988) p. 16. AET is a
nonprofit organization of retired Foreign Service Officers with
Middle East experience. Bernard Mills, UNRWA Director for Gaza,
expressed disgust that as a former army officer himself, he could
not persuade Israeli officers to stop ordering attacks on innocent
civilians.
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December 9, 1987, and January 14, 1988, she reported 22 killed
and 122 hospitalized for serious injuries. Lt. Lior of the
IDF stated, "They (the kids demonstrating) scamper like little
mice, and if you catch one then it's a ball, you beat him for
all the pleasure." An Israeli border guard admitted in
June 1987 to beating up and permanently injuring a 7 year old
boy as he left a mosque.
A Palestinian tour guide claims that: "Israel is trying
102to empty the West Bank of Palestinians." One organization,
Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man) , monitors human rights
violations and the process of creeping annexation.
Displacement of the local population, administrative and
collective punishments, secret judicial proceedings, 6 month
renewable detentions without charges, "systematic" abuse of
children, systematic torture are all aspects of living under
Israeli occupation. Any Turkish, British, Jordanian or
Israeli military decree of use for repression is selected and
enforced by the IDF. The IDF has issued over 1,000 military
decrees ranging from requiring a license to plant a tree or
garden to the deportation of people without trial to Jordan
or Lebanon. Decrees specify that any gathering of five or
more people is illegal.
American Friends Service Committee , op. cit. , p. 6.
"Eyeless in Gaza," by Shulamith Hareven, New Outlook:
Middle East Monthly . February, 1988, p. 18.
102 American Friends Service Committee , op. cit. , p. 4.
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Evidence indicates that the IDF, settlers and police are
routinely on the offensive . The forces deployed are ordered
to attack communities in nightraids leaving whole families
injured and turning up at hospitals for treatment. Israeli
soldiers confessed to such procedures and have made it clear
they receive orders to commit acts of state-terror. Shamir
explained the rioting in the occupied territories "was not a
demonstration of civil disobedience but a war" waged not at
the occupation but "against Israelis, against the existence
103 .
of the State of Israel." An Israeli soldier explained why
even during curfews they lobbed tear gas canisters at homes
and went into homes to beat up people: "In order to make our
presence known in the camps during curfews we were given
orders to knock on doors, enter inside and take men out. We
104
were to separate and beat them, especially the young ones."
The idea is to re-establish the awe that the army had
apparently lost, and to strike fear in the hearts of the
Palestinians, as a senior Israeli source explained.
According to Member of the Knesset Dedi Zucker, IDF
attacks on Palestinians are not a matter of an army simply
losing control or running amok but an Army "that encourages,
or even orders, the use of excessive force. Orders have been
given to troops outside houses to go inside and break him (the
103
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. 105 •Palestinian) to pieces.'" One military policeman
testified, "The whole chain of command in the Israeli army
told me, 'If you don't beat the person to the point he can't
walk, you haven't done a thing.'" Another soldier testified,
"Even if the local was not resisting arrest, we were to beat
him in order to deter him from further stone-throwing, and if
1 0Rpossible, to break legs." This same soldier from the
Givati Brigade pointed to Defense Minister Rabin's January 19,
1988, orders to employ beatings. Testimony by soldiers points
to General Yitzhak Mordechai, commander of the IDF Southern
Command as the originator of such orders.
UNRWA as of 25 June 1988 reported the following
statistics of deaths: 0-20 years-44%; 20-30 yrs.-35%; 31-59
yrs.-12%; over 60 yrs.-9%. In the first 6 months of the
uprising, 155 houses were demolished or sealed.
Defense Minister Rabin acknowledged that the army had
used sharpshooters against demonstrators but said the goal
was to "minimize casualties." Rabin defended the use of
lethal force. An Israeli officer testified, "I also know one
senior commander— I think he's a Kahanist—who walked around
with a sniper. Shooting at the legs, all very precise,
105 Christian Science Monitor . February 15, 1988, p. 4.
Zucker reports that beatings put 3 00 Palestininans in the hospital
each month.
106 Ibid . , p. 4.
107 Ibid . , p. 4.
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according to the law. . .We acted as if it were a built up area
1 08
combat situation. . .
"
The cycle of violence was initiated by the repressive
atmosphere of the occupation. Evidence of offensive acts
committed by the IDF indicates a pattern of initiating
violence on orders from higher authority. An affidavit filed
with a Human Rights delegation ( Eyewitness Israel , 16 June-5
July 1988) shows the involvement of Israeli officers: a
military officer instructed soldiers beating a 22 year old
man: "Beat him till he dies." The victim was attached to
the hood of a jeep and driven around the village.
Gaza and Balatta were the initial focal points of the
1987 uprising. Balatta was, according to one report, quiet
until Israeli Border Guards went on a rampage for 3 days and
109
nights as a means of teaching the populace a lesson.
Frank Collins, in Middle East International , asserts that
Israeli policy has been designed to provoke the situation
through the implementation of intensified repression under the
August, 1985, Iron Fist Policy. The motives include tactical
maneuverings of the military "mind;" encouraging unity against
the Palestinian enemy; and to prepare the grounds for "getting
rid of the Palestinians." While Meir Kahane calls on the army
to expel the Palestinians, General Rehavam Zelevi and Michael
1 08 New Outlook . February, 1988, p. 18.
109 .Middle East International , January 9, 1988.
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Dekel, Deputy Minister of Defense, advocate an incremental
policy of oppression and repression so that Palestinians will
leave. 110
In August, 1985, Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, presently
commander in Gaza, was acquitted of charges of violent
behavior based on evidence (Israeli commission of inquiry)
confirming the deaths of two Palestinians from skull fractures
sustained during beatings while under his supervision. The
two Palestinians were in his custody after their arrest for
attempting to hijack a bus in Gaza (April, 1984)
.
The Eyewitness Israel Human Rights Delegation has
documented acts of state terror in the Occupied Territories
and expressed specific concerns (statement July 5, 1988)
:
The conditions in the Occupied Territories are
characterized by systematic brutality and
dehumanizing practices against the Palestinians.
The delegation was particularly disturbed by the
Israeli violence perpetrated against children, the
elderly, the disabled and the infirm.
The Eyewitness Israel Human Rights Delegation summary of
state terror in the Occupied Territories includes a variety
of different terrorizing methods. The "Eyewitness Israel"
delegation collected testimony and affidavits which summarized
the following acts which fit into the definition of state-
terror. In most cases, their evidence is further
substantiated by Amnesty International Reports.
110 Middle East International , February 6, 1988.
111 Eyewitness Israel delegate report, 3 August 1988.
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1. Beatings: carried out routinely with clubs, and
often without provocation. Findings indicate a
pattern of injuries systematically inflicted. These
injuries include broken limbs and multiple
fractures. Beatings sometimes result in death.
Children and young men are particular targets.
2. Shootings: indiscriminate and at close range.
Ammunition includes rubber bullets (metal slugs with
rubber covering) and high velocity bullets.
3. Gas used extensively. It is frequently fired into
enclosed areas including hospitals, schools,
mosques, homes. This often results in severe
injuries, miscarriages, and death. Gas canisters
are also intentionally fired directly at persons.
4. Demolition of houses as a form of collective
punishment.
5. Collective punishments such as curfews, school
closings, demolition of houses, mass beatings, house
arrest and town arrest.
6. Closures, curfews and restrictions on movement
imposed on entire villages and camps accompanied by
the denial of food, water, electricity, and
communication. The terror here pertains to the
psychological anxiety and physical hardship induced
under such restrictions.
7. Confiscation of property including personal
belongings, food, harvests, farm equipment, money
and valuables. The invasion of privacy and
consequent dispossession of belongings and equipment
needed as means of support induces a state of fear.
8. Injections administered by soldiers. Unknown green
or clear substances forcibly injected into the arms,
legs, neck, and spinal area. Israeli security
forces have carried "black boxes" with syringes,
substances, and small hatchets or hammers. The
victim is forced to make a choice of which
punishment he prefers.
9. Abductions of people including children to distant
places or hostile areas at night and abandoning
them.
10. Denial of medical assistance including the
obstruction of ambulances, attacks on medical
92
personnel, denial of licenses to clinics, hospitals,
ambulances.
11. Administrative detentions for up to six months
without charge, renewable every six months.
Families are frequently not notified.
12. Confiscation of identify cards as a means of
collecting revenue. Coded identity cards are used
in conjunction with computer data banks. Anyone
without a proper identity card risks imprisonment.
13. Prison conditions made particularly harsh as a means
of inducing fear in the society. Prisoners are
often denied food, water, toilets, showers and
suffer from overcrowding. Food is often spoiled.
Prisoners in addition to facing psychological and
physical torture frequently are forcibly subjected
to sitting in the desert heat and sun or the extreme
cold. One prison has been identified as the "Bambi"
prison for the imprisonment and interrogation of
children ages six to twelve. The infamous Ansar I,
II, and III prisons are well-known for horrific
conditions. It has been reported that military
doctors routinely stitch up prisoners without
anesthesia.
14. Torture includes electric shock, testicle clamps,
stabbing with hypodermic needles in the testicles,
confinement to wooden box "cupboards" standing in
cold water.
15. Sweeping military raids on communities wherein
soldiers break into homes, smash furniture,
belongings, defecation or urination in rooms of
people's houses, and stealing belongings.
16. Humiliation by forcing people to sing, insult each
other, jump, insult the PLO, etc.
17. Deportations of people suspected of supporting
nationalism.
These findings further substantiate the claim that a
variety of different forms of state terror are commonly
experienced by the Palestinian population. It should be
emphasized that state terror acts, as indicated by the remarks
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of Israeli soldiers, are intended to create a state of fear
such that the populace will resign themselves to permanent
Israeli control over the territories. The use of state terror
is an effort to make revolt so expensive in human costs that
the populace simply gives up their struggle.
Summary of Case Study Findings for Israel and the Occupied
Territories
The following chart summarizes the case study findings
for Israel and the Occupied Territories:
Political Zionism
1. The state is devoted to the
security of the in-group? Yes
2. The state acquires land
resources for the exclusive
use of the in-group? Yes
3
.
The state governs over
people who are not granted
full and equal citizenship
rights? Yes
Acts of State Terror perpetrated by Israeli forces in the
Occupied Territories:
1. Beatings/Physical
Attacks. Yes
2. Shootings to injure
or kill. Yes
3. The offensive use of
gas. Yes
4. Denial of medical
care for the wounded. Yes
5. Sweeping raids. Yes
6. Detention without
limit or trial. Yes
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7. Prison conditions/
torture. Yes
8. Kidnappings and
abductions. Yes
9. Vigilante violence. Yes
10. Demolition of houses
as a collective
punishment. Yes
11. Collective punishments
such as curfews. Yes
12. Deportations, forced
removals or transfers
of people. Yes
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CHAPTER III
SOUTH AFRICA
Ideology
In order to evaluate the role ideology plays in defining
state security it is necessary to examine the security
prescriptions called for by South Africa's apartheid ideology.
By examining such prescriptions derived from apartheid, it is
possible to discover what constitutes state security under the
apartheid system.
Apartheid is the guiding ideology in South Africa.
According to apartheid ideology, the state must remain under
the exclusive control of the white population; otherwise the
white population will be insecure. As such, apartheid
structures the socio-economic and political relations of South
African society along racial lines. Apartheid as a term was
first used by the National Party in 194 8 when it introduced
it as a comprehensive program for society. Apartheid is an
Afrikaaner word which translates into separateness in English.
The National Party, the dominant political force in South
African parliamentary politics since 1948, has over the years
been successful in translating the ideology of apartheid into
practice. Apartheid ideology is translated into policy
through the coercive powers of the state. Apartheid is an
ideology designed to protect the dominant status of the white
minority (4.8 million), who rule a country of 24 million
Africans, 890,000 Indians, and 2.8 million "coloreds." In
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order to maintain white domination, the South African regime
has set aside reserves or Bantustans for 13 million Africans;
in this way, whites are able to express their version of
nationalism in dominant terms on 87% of territorial South
Africa while Africans are forced into the Bantustans
comprising 13 percent of the territory. It is important to
note that the basic foundations for apartheid existed prior
to 1948. Racial segregation had long been present in South
African society before 1948. Today, Africans can be granted
South African "citizenship," but this does not grant them
legal or political rights. Apartheid focuses on denying
racially integrated nationalism and instead enforces racial
separation as a means of securing the dominant position of
white nationalism in South Africa. Thus, apartheid is made
up of a series of subsystems based on race to which each
member of society is assigned. One system, that of the
whites, is dominant over the various subsystems. Thus,
Africans are the out-group.
Domination has two aspects according to Heribert Adam.
One is the objective functional and the other is the
Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 198 6) p. 15. Omond contends that racial
discrimination became institutionalized in 1910-1913 about the time
of the rise of Afrikaaner political power. The 1913 Natives Land
Act is cited as an early example. The Act of Union (1910) allowed
each of four provinces (states) to establish their own racial laws.
In the Cape and Natal, a few select blacks could vote; such was not
the case in Transvaal and the Orange Free State where Afrikaaners
dominated. The African National Congress (1912) was a direct
reaction to discriminatory disenfranchisement.
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subjective one of how it impacts on those who are dominated.
This study looks at both the functional role of apartheid and
the way it treats people. Apartheid serves the functional
role of ensuring white domination which in the apartheid
advocates nund is synonomous with the security of the white
population. Apartheid is, in effect, ethnocentric
nationalism. Whereas classical definitions of political
nationalism allow participation for all people, apartheid does
not; it remains solely an expression of Afrikaaner and "white"
nationalism. Self-determination applies only to the whites.
So-called "Utopian" apartheid recognizes the right of Africans
to have "self-rule" only through the political structures of
their respective tribes on territory allotted to them by the
South African regime.
Some analysts of the South African political scene have
suggested the inevitable failure of the Bantustan policy.
The maintenance of security amidst a series of statelets
packed with alienated African workers is thought by some to
be virtually impossible. The Bantustans could become
launching grounds for anti-apartheid operations. The basic
concept of the Bantustan policy seeks to accomplish the
following: (1) geographical segregation of as many Africans
as possible from non-Africans and of specific African ethnic
groups from each other; (2) Pretoria- sponsored cultural
relativism, and the elaboration of pseudo-traditional
authority structures; (3) an extension of the sphere of local
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autonomy under the authority of government-appointed chiefs,
which in effect, amounts to a shift from "direct" to
"indirect" rule. Africans under the apartheid system and the
2Bantustan policy are denied the right to nationalism.
Afrikaaner ideology is an exclusive and racist type of thought
which seeks to establish security for its people through
asymmetrical political relations with other peoples. The
functional role of apartheid includes not only its practical
structuring of society along racial lines, but also its
historical role in unifying and empowering the white
Afrikaaners. The myths of apartheid provide the whites with
a tribal lore of their own while at the same time justifying
their racist worldview.
Apartheid is an ideology containing a great deal of
mythology, according to Leonard Thompson. Thompson discusses
political mythologies in the following terms:
By a political myth, I mean a tale told about the
past to legitimize or discredit a regime; and by
political mythology, a cluster of such myths that
reinforce one another and jointly constitute the
historical element in the ideology of the regime or
its rival.
Thompson points out that political mythology could be, in an
ideal world, strongly democratic, scientifically valid and
Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Racial Segregation in South
Africa: Degrees and Kinds," Race and Politics in South Africa ,
edited by Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1978) p. 4.
Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid
(New Have: Yale University Press, 1985) p. 1.
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beneficial to society. Unfortunately few political
mythologies are of such a nature.
Thompson's analysis of apartheid traces its role in
history as providing the Afrikaaners with a religious based
mythology of a persecuted but "Chosen" people devoted to
spreading Christian civilization and Calvinist economic
development. Apartheid is an ideology with explicit racist-
religious rhetoric maintaining that blacks are descendants of
Ham, cursed to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water." God
ordained whites to be masters and rulers according to the
Afrikaaner theologians. Apartheid ideology is manichean in
that those deemed less civilized are the nonelect. These
myths were vitally important to the mobilization stage of
Afrikaanerdom when the building of nationalism required
commitment against the British and the indigenous African
population. With the ascendancy of Afrikaaner political and
economic might Afrikaaner nationalism in the form of apartheid
ideology became the dominant force for the structuring of
South African society.
Lambley traces the Afrikaaner ascendancy in South Africa
and the concomitant decline of the British. The process of
developing Afrikaaner nationalism led to the establishment of
a "state within a state" by 1910 and the consolidation of
Afrikaaner dominance in 1948. Lambley' s study of Afrikaaner
society shows the anti-British attitudes of Afrikaaners, and
the racism towards blacks. Lambley contends the political
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structures of the South African state to be feudalistic. The
decision-making elite in South Africa is based on the
Broederbond, a relatively small, secret, and closed society
of top Afrikaaners dedicated to the security of white
nationalism—through the maintenance of apartheid.
The ideology of apartheid which is comprehensive in its
structuring of the political, economic and social relations
in society, depends on myths such as racism, neo-Calvinism,
and territorial rights. The South African regime sees itself
fighting a defensive war from within the "laager". The
"laager mentality" or paradigm is evident in the expressions
of the South African leadership. The myth of a gallant,
heroic, chosen people fighting against the evils of barbarism
and atheism is ever present in the utterances of the South
5 . .African leadership. Thompson maintains that it is the
responsibility of intellectuals to cut through and expose the
mythologies which guide the operative behaviors of people.
Bishop Desmond Tutu focuses on the ideology of apartheid
as the basis for the crisis in South Africa:
Any student of the South African situation who is
worth his salt will point out that our trouble
really stems from apartheid, this sociopolitical
Laager is the Afrikaaner term used to describe the
circling of pioneer wagons in hostile areas to enable defense.
The concept is very similar to the Euro-american pioneers who
circled their wagons at night and during attack as a tactic. Today
the term implies being obsessed with security, of being surrounded
by enemies.
Thompson, op. cit. . pp. 144-145. The importance of the
laager is expressed by Andries Treurnicht.
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and economic dispensation which makes no pretense
of being democratic.
Bishop Tutu's analysis of apartheid ideology concludes
that it makes little long term sense, hence it relies on a
desperate authoritarianism. Such a system has to be
maintained through an elaborate police state infrastructure.
Bishop Desmond Tutu described the South African
government's security concerns:
And so there is an obsession with law and order,
and tough measures leading to the arrest of children
as young as seven years old, and to the detention
of an eleven year old boy for weeks at a time. When
people get obstreperous just knock them one in the
head and you will have sorted them out
properly! .. .Repressive measures seem to deal with
disorder in an efficient way that brooks no
nonsense, and is often attractive to those who fear
the invigorating uncertainties that occur when
different points of view are vying for the patronage
of the public.
Bishop Tutu points out that repressive measures deal with
symptoms of "the malaise of the body politics" such that
repression leads to a "superficial calm." Cycles of uprisings
and repression have long been a part of the South African
political scene—Sharpeville 1960, Soweto 1976 and 1985.
The South African state claims it is being subjected to
a "total onslaught" and is at war with subversion. The state
leadership, Botha in particular, asserts that reforms will
incrementally take place, but as of yet, there is no
Mark A. Uhlig, "The Coming Battle for South Africa,"
Apartheid in Crisis (New York: Vintage Books, 1986) p. 18.
Ibid
.
,
p. 16.
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comprehensive reform program which would dismantle the
structures of apartheid society. President Botha's successor
to be, F. W. de Klerk, strongly supports the maintenance of
white security (dominance) through apartheid.
South Africa has been characterized as a garrison state
in the process of fighting a war to preserve the apartheid
o
system. Many writers emphasize the economic aspects of the
apartheid structure and the tremendous privileges the system
provides for the 4.8 million whites. H.F. Dickie-Clark
contends that both material and ideal explanations play a part
9in the explanation of apartheid. The two variables should
not be separated. Apartheid as an ideology has economic as
well as security prescriptions; the two are integrally related
for apartheid structures economic inequality based on race.
Advocates of apartheid use a combination of economic,
political, religious, social, and racial arguments.
Ultimately their argument is based on security grounds.
Apartheid ideology, as stated earlier is concerned with
the security of white economic, political and social
supremacy. In the Apartheid mind, for whites to be secure in
Q
Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machines
(London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa,
1986)
Hamish F. Dickie-Clark, "Ideology in Recent Writings on
South Africa," South Africa: The Limits of Reform , edited by
Heribert Adam (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) p. 111.
Ideology according to Dickie-Clark is the interplay between
material and ideal factors.
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their privileges, separation of the races must be enforced.
The economic privileges enjoyed by the white population must
be maintained by holding onto the most productive land and
controlling the industries. The remainder of the country,
some 13% of the land, is assigned to the African population
in the form of dependent "statelets." The Group Areas Act of
1950 is an elaborate scheme used for assigning particular
"racial" groups to specific territories and areas.
Populations of people are shuffled and shifted around South
Africa to suit the economic and security requirements of the
state. Since separation of the races is a key pillar of
apartheid, "different" people should be assigned to different
areas. A democratic challenge to apartheid is, in light of
demographic realities, a challenge to the economic, political
and social privileges enjoyed by the white citizens. The
system boundaries established by apartheid define security.
If the boundaries of apartheid are breached, state security
is threatened.
In the face of serious internal and external challenges
to the apartheid establishment, two strains of apartheid are
advocated, one which advocates a slight re-structuring of
apartheid to allow for the development of a black middle
class, and the other which stands for no compromise on the
principles of apartheid. The latter prescription, advocated
by the conservative movement, has recently made some electoral
gains by challenging the National Party leadership as too
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"soft." The conservative wing of apartheid stands for no
concessions to the black population, however superficial they
may be. The former group led by Botha consists of the
business and military elite who argue that apartheid can be
relaxed and restructured in such a way that the overall
apartheid system can be preserved. In order to accomplish
this objective, they call for a sophisticated
counterinsurgency doctrine combining intensified repression
with limited modifications of apartheid laws. This is
promoted by the new modernist technocratic officers, the
"enlightened" politicians, and the business elite. The
"enlightened" apartheid promoters support the removal of
blatantly discriminatory laws; most of these pertain to the
use of public facilities and the legal restrictions on
employment.
Under Botha's leadership, the verligte ("enlightened")
wing of apartheid has held the upper position. The
conservative verkramptes ("narrow-minded") wing of apartheid
has had less political power. .
State Security Policies
A State of Emergency was declared in South Africa in
March, 1960 for the first time in the face of growing
rejection of the apartheid system. Government repression had
existed through the elaborate apartheid laws enforced by the
Cawthra, op. cit. , p. 26.
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security services. Opposition forces delayed the use of
violence until the post- Sharpeville era (1960) . Sixty-nine
peaceful black protestors had been shot at a demonstration in
Sharpville (1960) against the Pass Laws. Their deaths
triggered additional protests which were followed by the
declaration of a State of Emergency. During the 1960 's,
government repression contained the opposition to apartheid
and was largely successfully in maintaining the regime's
definition of security.
In 1974 , the collapse of the Portuguese empire gave
encouragement to the anti-apartheid struggle and placed the
apartheid regime in a precarious position. The "communist"
menace was, in the eyes of the apartheid establishment, now
on their very borders. The "onslaught" had begun. The war
in Rhodesia was escalating and the efficacy of black
nationalism was proving itself. Internally South Africa
experienced strikes and limited sabotage from 1960-1976.
On 16 June 197 6, in Soweto, peaceful student protests
against the inferior African educational system and the
imposition of the Afrikaaner language, were met with gunfire.
Within a week two hundred people had been killed. During the
Fall of 1976, riots and demonstrations were common in all four
provinces and the Bantustans. The incidents were for the
Stephan W. Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South
Africa's Hidden War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p.
26.
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most part spontaneous. After Soweto, the regime stepped up
its counterinsurgency policies. Although the uprisings of
1976-1977 had been put down it become increasingly clear in
the regime's perspective that military forces would need to
be deployed to maintain security. Resistance to the apartheid
system was manifested by the increasing number of school
boycotts, strikes, worker stayaways, attacks on police,
demonstrations, and rent strikes.
The South African Defense Force was deployed in large
numbers in the townships during 1978. Areas were sealed off
and sweeping military raids on black communities became
common. In 1981, a State of Alert was declared. During these
years, 1978-1985, evidence indicates that the security forces
were clearly on the offensive as part of the counterinsurgency
12
strategy (Total Strategy) .' At the same time, the regime
tried to implement policies designed to create a non-
threatening non-nationalist black leadership. When it became
obvious that these policies were doomed to failure, the level
of repression was increased.
To maintain state security, "the National Security
Doctrine" was developed from within the Cold War context of
the 1950" s and 1960's. The basic belief is that South Africa
is confronting a "total onslaught" of communism which is
defined in the broadest possible terms. The conflict in South
12 Ibid . . pp. 242-250.
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Africa has been framed in terms of a struggle against the
evils of Marxism. The apartheid establishment sees itself as
perhaps the only real fighter against the onslaught of Soviet
strategic designs. Critics of the apartheid regime are
defined as either conscious or unwitting supporters of
international communism. The National Security Doctrine
specified a "total response" on the part of South Africa's
Defense Forces. This state security doctrine was the
outgrowth of the Potgieter Commission of Inquiry which
established the foundation for a centralized intelligence
agency (BOSS) . The Bureau of State Security was in place by
1969. In 1972, a State Security Council was established to
13
manage all the aspects of regime security. During the early
1970' s, there was a bureaucratic struggle between the police
and BOSS versus the more sophisticated ("enlightened") circles
of the military, intelligence, and security establishment.
The latter won new influence under Botha.
Botha's friend and close advisor, General Magnus Malan
(Chief of South African Defense Force, SADF) , veteran of the
Algerian war (1960 's) and former student at the US Army
Command and General Staff College is a student of
counterinsurgency warfare who is well aware of the social and
13 Cawthra, op. cit. , p. 27. Cawthra provides a detailed
description of the rapid growth of the internal security
establishment in South Africa. He describes the notion in the
South African military that opposition to apartheid is synonomous
with communism. Such notions were developed during the 1950 's.
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political aspects of such wars. He played a critical role in
authoring South Africa's approach to internal security. The
counter-revolutionary theories of Andre Beufre are popular at
the SADF Joint Defense College. Beufre places particular
emphasis on the psychological aspects of warfare. Major
General G. L. Meiring of the SADF said in 1985, the use of
McCuen s The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War was prominent
as a guide to the principles of counterinsurgency at the SADF
14Joint Defense College.
South African military and security officials authored
a doctrine calculated to deal with the increasing resistance
to apartheid. This doctrine was a comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy called the "Total Strategy."
"Total Strategy" was in place by March of 1977 and
specified the East/West conflict as central to the situation
in South Africa. Total Strategy, furthermore, defined South
African security in terms of a broad,
national strategy to ensure the survival of a
society in which the principle of the right to self-
determination of the White nation must not be
regarded as being negotiable.
The doctrine of "Total Strategy" is all encompassing:
Coordination between government departments is of
the utmost importance. There are few if any
government departments which are not concerned with
one or the other aspect of national security, or
Ibid . . pp. 26-40, where one finds extensive discussion
of the personalities and institutions of the South African state
security system. McCuen was a US Army Lt. Colonel.
15 Ibid . . p. 29.
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which do not contribute to the realization of
national security.
Total Strategy defined almost all sectors of society as
coming under the rubric of South African Defense Force
concerns:
Political action; military/para military action;
economic action; psychological action; scientific
and technological action; religious cultural action;
manpower services; intelligence services; security
services; national supplies, resources and
production services; transport and distribution
services; financial services; community services;
telecommunication services.
State security, as of the 1977 Defense White Paper,
entered intrusively into all sectors of society. Thus, the
"national security state" was in place. Prime Minister Botha,
elected in September 1978, had acquired an indepth knowledge
of the Total Strategy doctrine from his tenure as Defense
Minister (1966-1980). Botha's expressed goal was to ensure
the survival of the apartheid system into the twenty-first
century. South Africa's strategy for survival entails (1)
internal political control through apartheid; (2) economic
growth; (3) the establishment of powerful military and
security systems and (4) a foreign policy strategy designed
to improve relations with surrounding African states. The
latter policy is calculated to coerce the frontline states
16 Ibid . , p. 29.
Ibid
.
,
p. 30.
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into accepting the South African regime. A secret and
rather sophisticated "National Security Management System" was
established in 1980. Its mandate extended to all sectors of
society specified by the Total Strategy doctrine outlined
above. The State Security Council, whose membership is not
fully known, is the executive body of the National Security
Management System which coordinates all activities pertaining
to state security.
The South African regime is characterized as having two
faces; one which is the civil facade of parliamentary
government and the other the State Security Council where real
19 ...power is located. Much of the credit for this national
security system goes to P. W. Botha, one time Defense
Minister, Prime Minister and after government reorganization
in 1984, State President. General Malan, one of Botha's
closest associates, helped author the present day Total
Strategy policies. South African strategists such as
Brigadier Roos see the conflict as 20% military and 80%
political — this approach is based on the ideas of
counterinsurgency experts such as Trinquier. The political
aspect of the counter-insurgency war is fought by the Civic
1
8
Ian Robertson and Colin Legum, Ibid . . pp. 165-166.
Michael Evans and Mark Phillips, "Intensifying Civil War:
The Role of the South African Defense Force," State, Resistance and
Change in South Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1988) pp. 117-145.
Evans and Phillips suggest the power of the security and military
forces is such that a shadow government exists composed of state
security officials.
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Action branch of the SADF. Civic Action teams include school
teachers in Soweto, medical teams for the homelands
(Bantustans) as well as maintaining roadblocks during SADF
sweeps on specific townships. General Malan asserted,
Militarily we can win the war. We can win it
tomorrow. But this is the type of battle you never
win on the military field. You win it in the
political field.
Grundy, an expert on the SADF, wonders how the South African
regime can possibly win the political battle by enforcing a
system that denies the rights of 70% of the population to
participate in the national political process.
Grundy traces the rapid development since 1979 of a state
security system with highly centralized control located in the
SSC (State Security Council) and the President's Office.
South Africa is an "executive state" with primary emphasis on
security matters as they relate to all sectors of society.
The security establishment is central to any analysis of
the South African state. The South African Defense Force has
been transformed from a small border defense force dedicated
to territorial integrity to one primarily concerned with
counter-insurgency and internal security. Prior to 1948, the
UDF (Union Defense Force) was organized along British lines
and had no role in domestic politics. With the National Party
victory in 1948, a process of Afrikaanerization was applied
20 ....Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African
Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) p. 27.
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to the military. The SADF underwent a gradual transformation
towards that of an ideological military. By the 1960 's and
1970' s the SADF was the frontline defense of the apartheid
regime.
In order to construct a state obsessed with white
security, an elaborate ideological socialization process is
present in South African society. White South Africans have
been militarized through the educational and media systems.
The SADF is portrayed and romanticized as a "People's Army."
Evidence clearly shows the SADF as an instrument of the ruling
National Party. The political indoctrination of troops
"contains a measure of pro-NP publicity. . .and an unflinching
22
advocacy of racial separation." The ideological impact of
apartheid and its prescriptions to insure white security are
mostly strongly evident in the Citizen Force and Commando
units, both of which are zealously committed to upholding the
apartheid system. These units are part-time territorial units
responsible for rural and urban area defense. They are
"volkish" and possess the Afrikaaner values of the Bible and
the gun. In South Africa, there is a militarization of
civilian life and a politicization of the military. Whites
23
entrust their future to military power.
21
22
23
Ibid
. , pp. 7-8.
Ibid
.
,
p. 110.
Ibid
.
,
p. 70.
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Grundy concludes that the security establishment in South
Africa is committed to an informal master plan authored by the
verliqte ("enlightened") wing of the National Party elite,
dedicated to the continuation of the white dominant society.
In order to maintain white domination, it is necessary to have
a volksleer or people's army for the white nation. The
security establishment led by the President and SSC do not
debate ends, for these are already assumed and are inherent
in apartheid ideology. They debate tactics and strategies.
According to Grundy's analysis regarding the security elite:
All at the top are committed to the maintenance of
the class/race based system. In this regard the
best form of conservatism is seen by some as a
managed liberalism.
The security establishment is an inevitable outgrowth of
the apartheid ideological system which is exclusively
dedicated to the security and privilege of whites. The
exclusive nature of apartheid ideology means that security is
viewed as a zero-sum game. Afrikaaner nationalism must
prevail and dominate South African Society. As Magubane
points out:
Apartheid. .. is more than a mere racial
discrimination or casual exploitation of one group
by another. It is a strict ideology of white
supremacy, racial oppression, and exploitation,
whose logical extremity
—
genocide —is tempered by
the need for African labor. "If only there were
24 Ibid
.
,
p. 112.
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some way," runs the white person's dream, "of having
them here and yet not having them here.
In order to maintain white supremacy, a state of fear
must be induced in those groups and individuals who are
potential and active challengers to the regime. Historically,
the potential challengers could not be exterminated because
of their labor value. On the other hand, they could not be
admitted to the political process because of their numbers.
Once the potential challengers began to actively rebel, the
security of the apartheid state required the use of ever
increasingly repressive measures.
Part of the counterinsurgency strategy of the apartheid
regime has been to create an alternative non-nationalist black
leadership which would accept the structures enforced by the
state. This leadership ideally would derive its legitimacy
from tribal foundations or through a constituency accepting
of apartheid. These encouragements by the government have
failed. Therefore the government, according to Moleah,". . .has
nowhere else to turn. Beyond repression and violence it has
nowhere.
"
Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, The Political Economy of
Race and Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1979) p. 250.
Alfred T. Moleah, "South Africa Under Siege: The Ever-
deepening Crisis of Apartheid," Without Prejudice: The EAFORD
International Review of Racial Discrimination , 1/1 (Fall, 1987) p.
83.
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The South African regime offers no future program, except
minor adjustments in the superficial and overtly crude aspects
of apartheid; apartheid faces a majority population committed
to the overthrow of its main premise of white supremacy. The
apartheid regime can only respond with military action and
state violence.
The South African Government's Surplus People Project
Report of 1983 estimated 3,522,900 people had been removed
from one place and relocated to another between 1960 and 1983.
In 1986, 1.8 million people were slated by government orders
for removal. Only 2,262 white families were removed between
1951 and 1981. The process of removing whites from one area
to another is entirely different from that of blacks.
Removals have been carried out for a variety of reasons
ranging from urban development schemes to military and
security requirements. The Transvaal Province is most noted
of the four provinces for removals—1,295,4 00 people have been
removed and another 605,000 are under the threat of removal.
The process for removal begins with the communication of
government orders to community leaders followed by the use of
force if such orders and deadlines are resisted.
Denemark and Lehman, writing in 1984, contend that the
South African regime has maintained itself through the use of
political repression and state terror. In order to put the
apartheid ideological system into practice, state repression
must be used. State-terror is viewed as an escalation in the
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level and types of government violence. Denemark and Lehman
claim that a clear distinction between repression and state
terror is difficult. Terror is more direct and includes the
use of military and police attacks, raids; the security laws
which arbitrarily deny rights; and the forced relocations of
large numbers of people. It is estimated that 6.0 millions
Africans have been moved as a result of the Bantustan policy.
Denemark concludes that state terror emanates from
conditions peculiar to the state. The state is maintained
through an expensive policy of terror. Johnstone
characterizes the South African situation as essentially a
Human Rights struggle:
This ongoing repression of human rights struggles
is thus another important dimension of the human
rights problem in South Africa. As a systematic
violation of human rights, apartheid has generated
an intensifying dialectic of resistance and
repression, in which human rights have been even
further abused by direct and indirect forms of state
terror.
Johnstone traces the latest round of repression to 1984
and asserts that the increase is largely due to the lack of
success in co-opting the black population into accepting the
apartheid system.
Types of State Terror in South Africa
The following is a description of specific types of state
terror used in South Africa. There is a difference in the
Frederick Johnstone, "South Africa," International
Handbook of Human Rights , edited by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E.
Howard (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) p. 350.
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quality and quantity of information on South African and
Israeli human rights abuses. There is a great deal more in
the way of detailed material on Israeli state terror. The
information and documents from Palestinian, Israeli and UN
Human Rights sources are much better in documenting the
experiences of individual victims and specific Israeli
operations. Such detailed and extensive information for South
Africa was not available to this researcher. Nevertheless,
it was possible to test for the acts of state terror.
Shootings are evidently one of the most common responses
of the security forces. Evidence indicates that SADF and
police forces do not shoot only in self-defense, but rather
initiate offensive action. An example of such an incident
occurred on 21 March 1985 on the 25th anniversary of the
Sharpeville massacre (1960) . The police opened fire on a
funeral procession near Uitenhage. Twenty people, including
children, were killed and many others wounded. The police
were equipped with lethal ammunition and firearms instead of
the usual riot gear on orders of the police commanders.
28Fifteen of the twenty killed were shot in the back. Amnesty
International has expressed strong concern about the
systematic, deliberate policy of using lethal force on
demonstrators. The South African regime has granted full
28 Amnesty International, South Africa Briefing (London:
Amnesty International Publications, 1986) p. 1. This report
contains information on the types of state terror used and the
casualties.
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immunity to law enforcement personnel as a part of the State
of Emergency.
The escalation of state-terror by shooting was
particularly evident between September, 1984, and late
November, 1985, during which 800 people were killed, most of
whom were shot by police.
The SADF and police forces carry out large-scale
"pacification" operations by sealing off areas followed by
sweeping raids wherein houses are systematically searched.
Students are often subjected to whippings and beatings by the
SADF and police. Night curfews are imposed on townships.
Propaganda messages and leaflets are dropped from armored cars
and helicopters. Part of the psychological warfare strategy
has even included distributing toy armored cars to children
29in areas terrorized by their presence. Widespread attacks
on communities and individuals have been documented:
All over the country, township residents reported
widespread and often indiscriminate brutality by
the regime's forces, including beatings, tortures,
assaults, rapes, abductions, attacks on children
and interference with injured people. Press reports
and affidavits drawn up by victims reveal a pattern
of police and army brutality which was repeated over
and over in townships across the country.
Water canons, tear gas, rubber bullets, shotguns, whips
and batons have been widely used by the police and SADF.
Reports charge the SADF of driving through townships in
29 Cawthra, op. cit. . pp. 251-252.
30 Ibid . . p. 252.
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armored vehicles firing indiscriminately at houses and people
even when no protest, demonstration or political activity of
any kind was taking place. Children have been beaten publicly
as a lesson to others. Incidents have been reported where the
police and/or SADF lured a crowd into ambushes, where they
were trapped and subjected to gunfire. One SADF soldier
reported the following:
We come up on a pick-up truck loaded with children
and youths who show us the clenched fist.
The cops go into action. The pick-up is overtaken
and forced to stop. Black bodies spill off in all
directions as the cops tumble out in pursuit. Soon,
they return with their catch: a boy of about 10
whom they hit and slap as they drag him into the
vehicle where they continue to slap and punch. . .We
trundle on. . .There is a loud dong as a stone hits
the armor and bounces in through the roof opening.
The sergeant acts immediately, sending off a 37 mm
gas canister. It lands on a house and the residents
pour out coughing eyes streaming. We go and watch
briefly, the cops laugh loudly. .
.
The funeral is over. The returning crowd starts to
break up. Knots of people on the street corners
sign and shout defiance. . .We launch into a hurtling,
lurching circuit, past streams of panicking, running
people, pumping out gas and rubber bullets. It's
over in a couple of minutes. The cops prepare for
the second round but the crowd has dispersed. There
is an atmosphere of sport. Eventually we return to
the police station. The police have brought in a
man (ostensibly a stonethrower) and derive much
sport from beating him and poking him with the
sjamboks and truncheons in front of the station and
in the back of a van. .
.
Evidence also shows a pattern of police commanders not
issuing available riot equipment and purposely encouraging
Ibid . . pp. 253-254.
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32the use of rifles. Automatic weapons which fire rubber
bullets in continuous streams have been used in addition to
automatic tear gas guns which do the same. The South African
Police journal, Servamus . suggested that European riot control
methods are ineffective and impractical, and that only severe
methods are efficacious. Riots are considered part of the
"total communist onslaught" and thus are treated as combat
situations. From July, 1985, to March, 1986, between 800-
1,000 people were killed (200 children) , many more wounded and
8,000 detained.
The legal bases for government repression in South Africa
are extensive and are beyond the scope of this research. A
whole series of laws are used to enforce the apartheid system
and counter opposition to the regime. The Public Safety Act
of 1953 empowers the State President with the right to declare
State of Emergency rule. The whole of South Africa has been
under State of Emergency rule since June, 198 6. The Internal
Security Act of 1982 makes indefinite detention without
charges or trial legal. Each State of Emergency declaration
has widened the police powers of the state. United Democratic
Front leaders theorize that the State of Emergency is partly
used as a "legal" cover for the encouragement of state-
33
sponsored violence by vigilante groups. Vigilante groups
32 Ibid . . pp. 254.
African Research Bulletin , May 15, 1987. p. 8891.
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include white and black death squads encouraged or ignored by
the government. If these charges have merit the prospective
use of right-wing death squads in South Africa is likely to
increase.
The crackdowns in South Africa appear to be of two types:
collective punishments which are indiscriminate attacks on
people irrespective of their acts and behaviors, and more
direct repression which is focused on any community leaders
who express anti-apartheid positions. The regime directs its
security forces against anyone who opposes apartheid. Thus,
it defines the system boundaries as any active criticism of
apartheid whether from the left, liberal or moderate sector.
This contradicts the regime's claim to be fighting a war
against communist subversion.
The use of repression and state-terror has increased the
determination of young people to oppose the apartheid
establishment. Police and SADF violent actions have greatly
34
contributed to the recruitment of anti-apartheid forces.
During the partial State of Emergency declared in 1985 (July,
1985-March, 1986), 8,000 people were detained.
Of the 30,000 people detained since the June, 1986, State
of Emergency, 10,000 were under 18 years of age. Once a
person is arrested, it is likely they will experience torture.
In 1987, the International Commission of Jurists charged South
34 Davis, op. cit. . p. 28.
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Africa with "widespread use of torture and violence even
against children as part of a repressive strategy." The
report specifically deplores the use of torture against
detainees and children, the routine use of excessive force at
marches, demonstrations and protests, and the encouragement
35
of vigilante groups.
Evidence indicates the frequently offensive nature of
SADF and police operations. On 27 April 1987, and without
warning, the police charged an unsuspecting group of
University of Cape Town students while they were sitting on
the campus lawn. Police used whips and made mass arrests.
In June, 1980, "colored" students protested in the
Western Cape to commemorate the 1976 Sharpeville uprisings as
well as the inferior apartheid educational system.
Camouflaged police were armed and ordered by the Police
Commissioner to "shoot to kill." Later, the Minister of
Police apologized for, as he put it, "an unfortunate choice
37 • •
of words." Sixty people were shot dead during one week in
June, 1980.
The use of detention without trial is considered by some
to be the most effective form of repression in South Africa.
Anyone active in union, church, or student organizations
Africa Research Bulletin . May 15, 1987. p. 8891.
Julie Frederikse, South Africa; A Different Kind of War:
From Soweto to Pretoria (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) pp. 18-19.
37 Ibid . . pp. 18-19.
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opposed to apartheid knows he/she can be picked up anytime
without charges or a warrant and held indefinitely and
incommunicado. Detentions are frequently used simply to
38
remove a person from society for a given time.
A white South African doctor who moved to South Africa
from Kenya in 1964 because he thought life under a black
government would be intolerable was found hanged in his cell
after his arrest by the South African security forces for
union activities. His wife, once a supporter of apartheid,
now says:
I consider myself a very loyal South African and I
still think I am, but I think the security police
are exactly the same as the Gestapo were. They are
doing in this country what the Gestapo were doing
in Nazi, Germany.
The use of shootings has been described as "the most
40
chilling form of state repression" in South Africa.
Shootings are so freely authorized that when an entire family
was accidentally gunned down in 1983 (Johannesburg) by police
in unmarked cars, the Minister of Law and Order explained that
no judicial inquiry should be made because the Criminal
Procedures Act grants police the right to shoot and kill any
41
suspect.
Ibid .
.
p. 116.
Ibid . p. 116.
Ibid . p. 133.
Ibid., p. 133.
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Retired Police General Frans Stander claimed his son, a
police officer, became a bank robber after the 1976 uprisings
when the son confessed to killing 22 blacks: "Andre loved
blacks and always got on very well with his black colleagues,
42but as a policeman he was forced to shoot kaffirs."
A summary of different types of state terror used in
South Africa exposes the range of acts commonly committed by
South African military and police forces. The following forms
of state terrorism have been documented by Amnesty
International, Africa Research Bulletin, Cawthra, and
Frederikse:
1. Shootings of demonstrators often without
provocation, indiscriminate shootings from armored
vehicles of people and houses in townships.
2. Mass arrests and detention without charges or trial.
Prisoners are held incommunicado.
3. Physical attacks and beatings. Use of whips
(sjamboks) and canes.
4. Police and SADF sweeping raids and attacks on sealed
off communities and townships.
5. Forced removal and relocations of people for
apartheid, security, or "economic development"
reasons. Use of bulldozers to demolish homes.
Removals range from small and large groups of
"squatters" to long time residents living in
permanent quarters. Forced removals are part of
the apartheid policy of consolidating Africans in
the "homelands."
6. Torture of prisoners on a widespread basis. Use of
electric shock, extraction of teeth, clubbing, use
of Sjamboks, beatings, mock executions, hangings,
"suicides," sensory deprivation.
42 Ibid
.
,
p. 133
.
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7. Abductions and disappearances of government
opponents.
8. Torture of children and youths. Beatings of youths
inside armored vehicles.
The constant patrolling of communities is also a means
of inducing a psychological state of fear. Lelyveld discusses
the psychological terror imposed on blacks by the gun
brandishing plainclothes white security cops who patrol the
townships. But the presence of security forces and their
efforts to induce a forced awe through terror has become less
efficacious as the nationalist struggle achieves successful
operations against the security forces. More and more the
regime must rely on offensive actions, not just presence.
Schlemmer discusses the demonstration effect of state
violence on the South African population:
It is well known inside and outside South Africa
that thousands of people over the years have been
detained without trial on terms of security
legislation. Furthermore, the occurrences of deaths
in detention are well published and quite
understandably create a climate of fear among would-
be political activists.
The acts of state terror described above provide
substantial evidence that the South African state employs
state terror as a means of instilling fear in the black
population.
43 Lawrence Schlemmer, "Build-up to Revolution or Impasse?"
South Africa: The Limits of Reform Politics , edited by Heribert
Adam, (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) p. 75.
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Summary of Case Study Findings for South Africa
The following chart summarizes the case study findings
for South Africa:
1. The state is devoted to the
security of the in-group?
2. The state acquires land
resources for the exclusive
use of the in-group?
3
.
The state governs over
people who are not granted
full and equal citizenship
rights?
Apartheid
Yes
Yes
Yes
Acts of State Terror
1. Beatings/Physical
Attacks.
2. Shootings to injure
or kill.
3. The offensive use of
gas.
4. Denial of medical
care for the wounded.
5. Sweeping raids.
6. Detention without
limit or trial.
7. Prison conditions/
torture.
8. Kidnappings and
abductions.
9. Vigilante violence.
10. Demolition of houses
as a collective
punishment.
Yes
Yes
Unsure
Unsure
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Unsure
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11. Collective punishments
such as curfews. Yes
12. Deportations, forced
removals or transfers
of people. Yes
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This case study analysis of political Zionism and
Apartheid evaluated each ideology on the basis of whether it
satisfied the requirements to be properly classified as an
exclusivist ideology. The three requirements of (1) the
state's devotion to the security of the in-group; (2) the
state's acquisition of land and resources for the exclusive
use of the in-group; and (3) the state's governance over
people not granted full and equal citizenship rights, were
fulfilled by political Zionism and Apartheid. The two
countries were tested for their use of state terrorism against
the out-group. Both countries have implemented and enforced
policies of repressive martial rule over the out-group.
Israel and South Africa were found to commit acts of state
terror against the out-group, the Palestinians and Africans
respectively
.
Under an exclusivist ideology wherein the state is
committed to the security of one national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, it is logical (within that paradigm) that
such ideologies facilitate extreme violent state acts against
those who reject an asymmetrical political structure. An
exclusivist ideological stance defines an in-group and an out-
group and structures a relationship in which one group is
supreme and one is subordinate. When such ideologically
derived structures are translated into repressive practical
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policies such as martial law, or state of emergency rule, it
is no wonder that those who bear the impact of such policies
take efforts to resist. In fact, evidence indicates that the
catalyst for changing a resistor into a more determined
fighter is the resistor's victimization by state terror. The
horrific treatment an arrestee receives in prison is likely
to increase not decrease the individual's militancy.
This thesis has shown the offensive nature of state
terrorism whereby the forces of the state initiate operations
with the intention of instilling an atmosphere of fear such
that the populace resigns itself to the status guo. At the
same time, the security forces sometimes initiate offensive
operations designed to provoke, and thus draw, so-called
militants out into the open as a means of creating the
circumstances whereby they can be eliminated or arrested. The
researcher of state terrorism is in a difficult position
simply due to the fact that governments in general take
precautions to hide their violent acts. The media coverage
of Israeli soldiers clubbing Palestinian youths lasted only
for a few months before censorship was imposed. Strict
censorship has always made it difficult to monitor South
African government violence. South Africa's remoteness may
also partially explain why it is difficult to obtain indepth
human rights information of the kind that exists on the
Palestinian condition. An additional factor is, no doubt,
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that of education and the Palestinian awareness of the
importance of carefully recording violent state actions.
Specific types of policies and acts of state terror
appear to be similar in both cases. The policy response in
both cases is some form of counterinsurgency-martial law; more
specifically, the Israeli government's Iron Fist policy or the
South African government's State of Emergency and Total
Strategy policies. The acts themselves are not so different
in each case. Shooting is the most common of the deadly or
severely injurious acts. Beating or physical attack on the
person with a club is apparently more prevalent in the
Occupied Territories than in South Africa. The use of gas is
evidently another difference in the two cases. According to
available evidence, it seems the Israelis have used gas more
extensively in close quarters by shooting it directly into
homes. The issue herein is not so much exactly which state
uses more or less of certain types of state terror, but rather
the documentation of actual use. On this account, it is
clearly evident that both states do use state terrorism.
After researching the question of exclusivist ideology
and state terror in the Israeli Occupied Territories and in
South Africa, it is evident that with such ideologies as
political Zionism and apartheid in force, there is little in
the way of positive prospects for the future. The
alternatives under Revisionist Zionism are limited. The
following are possibilities:
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1. Maintenance of the status quo i.e. Israeli military
occupation of the Occupied Territories, the continuation of
state terror.
2. Continued Israeli military presence with further
attempts to "Ottomanize" the area by holding limited
"autonomy" elections and talks. State terror would be used
against those individuals, spokesmen and candidates not
specifically approved by Israel, which could be the
overwhelming majority of the population.
3. Expulsion or transfer of large numbers of
Palestinians either within a short time period or in a long,
drawn-out process. State terror on an extremely wide scale
would be required.
As long as Revisionist Zionism continues to guide the
thinking of Israeli policy makers, there is no chance of a
two state solution. Acceptance of a two state solution would
mean the end of Revisionist Zionism. It would also entail the
severe modification of general Zionist thought towards the
acceptance of a smaller Israeli state, one much less in size
than the Eretz Israel called for in mainstream political
Zionism. Neither Likud nor Labor accepts a two state solution
to the conflict.
It is difficult to predict the course of events in regard
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One thing is certain
—
Israel wants the West Bank and Gaza territories, but does not
want or need the Palestinian population. This places the
Palestinians in a frightfully vulnerable position. Political
Zionism structures the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the
context of a zero-sum game. It is unlikely that the Israeli
opposition is strong enough to exert enough pressure to alter
the values of the Israeli state and populace. However, the
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Palestinian Intifadah has become a world famous example of
resistance. The Intifadah has been very successful in
mobilizing the Palestinian community against the occupation.
Resistance of this kind may be able to alter ideological
values, policies and acts of state terrorism. Much of this
depends on how dogmatic and capable the political Zionists
are.
As for South Africa, there is no hope for a negotiated
settlement as long as the Apartheid regime exists. Apartheid
and the Bantustan policy would clearly have to go before any
solution could be found. The alternatives under the present
realities are seen as follows:
1. Maintenance of the status quo i.e. Apartheid through
martial law, state of emergency rule and state terrorism.
2. Maintenance of the status quo with superficial
changes in Apartheid which would subject Africans to less
public racism and segregation. State terrorism would continue
to be used against those not satisfied with slight
modifications in Apartheid.
The resistance to apartheid is supported and shared by
some white South Africans, the South African Indian community,
and the international community. Despite the level of
opposition, the South African regime stands firmly behind the
basic principles of apartheid. The counterinsurgency
"experts" in the South African government think they can solve
their problem through the sophisticated use of force and co-
optation. Co-optation is successful to some degree as is
evident by the number of black police and soldiers serving
133
under white command. However, in the long term, more intense
violence is in the offing. By clinging to apartheid, the
South African regime severly limits any solution which would
be non-, or at least less, violent. Apartheid is a violent
and degrading ideology which establishes a zero-sum game
between white apartheid supporters and Africans. There is
reason to think a white minority could live in a democratic
South Africa. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique all have
minority white communities. However, if white South Africans
want a strictly white country, they may eventually have to
withdraw into the Cape Province. The apartheid regime is not
likely to have the repressive resources needed to maintain
control over the whole of South Africa. Before that happens,
there will be a protracted and violent conflict in South
Africa.
As long as the present ideological outlooks in Israel
and South Africa remain as they are, there will be a
continuation of state terror. Within each ideology, there is
the explicit right of only one group (the in-group to use
Adorno's term) to express national self-determination and
statehood. Such an asymmetrical structuring of relations is
likely to spell conflict anywhere it is found.
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Ideology, State Security, and State Terrorism: A
Comparative Study is a thesis which informally tests the
following hypothesis: Ideologies which specify one particular
group as having the exclusive and, therefore, asymmetrical
right to the governance of a state, facilitate the use of
state terrorism against people defined as an out-group. A
proper test of this hypothesis is not possible within the
limits of a Master's Thesis, so two countries have been
selected for case study analysis: Israel in the Occupied
Territories and South Africa. While a two-country case study
is not sufficient to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis the
study has value as an informal test.
The thesis tests for an exclusivist ideology and the use
of state terrorism. State policies of martial law and state
of emergency rule are examined to see if they translate
ideological perspectives into practical action. An
exclusivist ideology was operationally defined as was state
terrorism. The criteria for both variables were then applied
to the two selected states.
This thesis found that both states have an exclusivist-
ideology and practice state terrorism. Both states also have
policies of martial law and state of emergency rule. The
state terror in both countries is often offensive, and
initiated against people who have not been proven to have
committed any threatening acts.
The concluding chapter assesses the possible alternatives
under the respective ideological paradigms to see what
potentialities may take place in the future.
The findings of this thesis indicate that under the
tenets of Apartheid and political Zionism, there is little
prospect for an end to state terror.
